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Abstract. Malfunctions of a mobile ad hoc network (MANET) protocol caused by a concep-
tual mistake in the protocol design, rather than unreliable communication, can often be detected
only by considering communication among the nodes in the network to be reliable. In Restricted
Broadcast Process Theory, which was developed for the specification and verification of MANET
protocols, the communication operator is lossy. Replacing unreliable with reliable communica-
tion invalidates existing results for this process theory. We examine the effects of this adaptation
on the semantics of the framework with regard to the non-blocking property of communication in
MANETs, the notion of behavioral equivalence relation and its axiomatization. We illustrate the
applicability of our framework through a simple routing protocol. To prove its correctness, we
introduce a novel proof process, based on a precongruence relation.
Keywords: Mobile ad hoc network, restricted broadcast, process algebra, behavioral congru-
ence, refinement.
1. Introduction
The applicability of wireless communication is growing rapidly in areas like home networks and
satellite transmissions, due to their broadcasting nature. Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) consist of
several portable hosts with no pre-existing infrastructure, such as routers in wired networks or access
points in managed (infrastructure) wireless networks. The design of MANETprotocols is complicated,
because due to mobility of nodes the topology of communication links is dynamic. Important MANET
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protocols such as the Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol [1] contained
flaws in their original design and have been revised accordingly. Formal methods can be applied in
the early phases of the protocol development to analyze and capture conceptual errors before their
implementation. For instance, some errors in the design of AODV were found in [2, 3, 4, 5] using
formal techniques.
There are numerous applications of existing formal frameworks such as SPIN [6, 7, 2] and UP-
PAAL [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] for the analysis of MANET protocols. Lack of support for compositional
modeling and arbitrary topology changes motivates developing a new approach, tailored to the domain
of MANETs, with a primitive for local broadcast and supporting the verification of MANET proto-
cols against changes of the underlying topology. The tailored formal modeling framework should
provide some form of wireless communication which varies at the different layers of the Open Sys-
tems Interconnection (OSI) model: physical, data link, network, transport, session, presentation, and
application. For instance, the data link layer is responsible for transferring data across the physical
link and handling conflicts due to simultaneous accesses to the shared media. In contrast, commu-
nication at the network layer provides point-to-point communication between two nodes that are
not directly connected through appropriate routing of messages by using the communication ser-
vice of the data link layer. Most frameworks for the formal analysis of MANET protocols, such as
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 5], focus on protocols above the data link layer; hence they support
the core services of this layer, which means that local broadcast is the primitive means of communica-
tion. Wireless communication at this layer is non-blocking, i.e., the sender broadcasts irrespective of
the readiness of its receivers, and is asynchronous, i.e., received packets are buffered at the receiver.
The data link layer of a node processes the packet if it is an intended destination. While a node is busy
processing a message, it can still receive messages, buffer them and process them later. However,
if two different nodes broadcast simultaneously with a common node in their range, the latter node
cannot receive both messages and drops one of them, which is called the hidden node problem. We
say that wireless communication is reliable if the intended receivers successfully receive the packet.
In other words, message delivery is guaranteed to all connected neighbors.
Although lossy communication is an integral part of MANETs, mimicking it faithfully in a formal
framework can hamper the formal analysis of MANET protocols. To obtain a deeper understanding
of a malfunctioning of such a protocol due to a conceptual mistakes in its design rather than unreliable
communication, it may be helpful to consider communication reliable, meaning that the possibility
of the hidden node problem is omitted from the framework. Therefore we introduced the process al-
gebra Reliable Restricted Broadcast Process Theory (RRBPT) in [22], to perform model checking of
MANET protocols in a setting where communication is reliable. It is a variant of Restricted Broad-
cast Process Theory (RBPT) that we introduced previously in [23] for the modeling and analysis of
protocols above the data link layer. The underlying semantic model of RBPT, a so-called constrained
labeled transition system (CLTS), implicitly considers mobility of nodes with the novel notion of a
network constraint, which abstractly defines a set of topologies: those satisfying the given connec-
tivity constraints. The transitions of a CLTS are annotated with appropriate network constraints to
restrict the behavior to MANETs with a topology of the specified ones. RBPT was extended with a
set of auxiliary operators to reason about MANETs by equational reasoning, so-called Computed Net-
work Process Theory (CNT) [24]. We provided a sound and complete axiomatization for CNT terms
with finite-state behaviors, modulo so-called rooted branching computed network bisimilarity. This
axiomatization enables linearization of processes at the syntactic level to take advantage of symbolic
verification [25, 26], especially when the network is composed of similar nodes [27, 28].
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Somewhat surprisingly, all these results do not carry over in a straightforward fashion from RBPT
to RRBPT. To put the model checking approach presented in [22] on a firm basis, the current paper
develops the formal foundations for RRBPT and modifies the core of CNT. In a lossy setting, the non-
blocking property of local broadcast communication is an immediate consequence of the rule Par and
its counterpart for the parallel composition:
t1
a
−→ t′1
t1 ‖ t2
a
−→ t′1 ‖ t2
, which expresses that if a node is not
ready to participate in a communication, then we can assume that either it was disconnected from the
sender or it was connected but has lost the message. However, in the reliable setting, to guarantee
the non-blocking property, nodes should always be input-enabled. RRBPT provides a sensing operator
which allows to change the control flow of a process depending on the status of node connectivity with
other nodes. The input-enabledness feature is ensured through the RRBPT operational rules, where
the main difference between RRBPT and RBPT is: in RRBPT, nodes lose a communication only
when they are disconnected and are always input-enabled. We recap challenges of bringing input-
enabledness feature in the semantics of RRBPT in the presence of the sensing operator. Furthermore,
the behavioral equivalence relation of CNT setting is not a congruence with respect to parallel compo-
sition anymore. To support the desired distinguishing power, we provide a new bisimulation relation
which guarantees the congruence property for MANETs. RRBPT can be extended in the same way
as RBPT with computed network terms and the auxiliary operators left merge ( ) and communication
merge (|) to provide a sound and complete axiomatization for the parallel composition. However, the
input-enabledness feature and the new sensing operator require new auxiliary operators to assist their
axiomatization. To this aim, we discuss the appropriate axioms of RRBPT. We utilize our axioms to
analyze the correctness of protocols at the syntactic level. To this aim, we facilitate the specification
of the protocol behaviors preconditioned to multihop constraints and then introduce a new notion of
refinement among protocol implementations and their specifications. We demonstrate the applicability
of our framework by analyzing and proving the correctness of a simple routing protocol inspired by
the AODV protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 4 introduce our semantic model and explain
how it is helpful in giving semantics to reliable communication. Section 3 introduces the syntax of
RRBPT. Sections 5 and 6 provide the appropriate notion of behavioral equivalence and axioms in the
reliable setting, respectively. We demonstrate the applicability of our new framework by analyzing a
simple routing protocol in Section 7. We review and compare the related process algebraic frameworks
in depth in Section 8 before concluding the paper.
2. Constrained Labeled Transition Systems
Let Loc denote a set of network addresses, ranged over by ℓ. Viewing a network topology as a directed
graph, it can be defined as γ : Loc → IP (Loc), where γ(A) expresses the set of nodes that are
directly connected to A, and hence, can receive message from A. A network constraint C is a set
of connectivity pairs : Loc × Loc and disconnectivity pairs 6 : Loc × Loc. In this setting, non-
existence of (dis)connectivity information between two addresses implies lack of information about
this link (which can e.g. be helpful when the link has no effect on the evolution of the network). For
instance, B A denotes that A is connected to B directly and consequently A can receive data sent
by B as before, while B 6 A denotes that A is not connected to B directly and consequently cannot
receive any message from B. The direction of an arrow shows the direction of information flow. We
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write {B  A,C, B 6 D,E} instead of {B  A, B  C, B 6 D, B 6 E}. The set Loc is
extended with the unknown address ? to represent the address of a node which is still not known or
concealed from an external observer. For instance, the leader address of a node can be initialized
to this value. Furthermore, to define the semantics of communicating nodes in terms of restrictions
over the topology in a compositional way, the semantics of receive actions can be defined through an
unknown sender, which will be replaced by a known address when the receive actions are composed
with the corresponding send action at a specific node (see Section 4).
A network constraint C is said to be well-formed if ∀ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ Loc (ℓ ℓ′ 6∈ C ∨ ℓ 6 ℓ′ 6∈ C).
Let Cv(Loc) denote the set of well-formed network constraints that can be defined over the network
addresses in Loc. We define an ordering on network constraints. We say that C1 4 C2 iff C2 ⊆ C1
or ∃ ℓ ∈ Loc (C2[ℓ/?] ⊆ C1), where d[d1/d2] denotes the substitution of d1 for d2 in d; this can be
extended to process terms. For instance, {B  A} 4 {? A} and {B  A, B  C} 4 {B  
A}. Each well-formed network constraint C represents the set of network topologies that satisfy the
(dis)connectivity pairs in C, i.e., Γ(C) = {γ | CΓ(γ) 4 C} where CΓ(γ) = {ℓ ℓ
′ | ℓ′ ∈ γ(ℓ)} ∪ {ℓ 6 
ℓ′ | ℓ′ 6∈ γ(ℓ)} extracts all one-hop (dis)connectivity information from γ. So the empty network
constraint {} still denotes all possible topologies over Loc. The negation ¬C of network constraint C
is obtained by negating all its (dis)connectivity pairs. Clearly, if C is well-formed then so is ¬C.
Constrained labeled transition systems (CLTSs) provide a semantic model for the operational
behavior of MANETs. Let Msg denote a set of messages communicated over a network and ranged
over by m. Let Act be the network send and receive actions with signatures nsnd : Msg × Loc and
nrcv : Msg , respectively. The send action nsnd(m, ℓ) denotes that the message m is transmitted from
a node with the address ℓ, while the receive action nrcv(m) denotes that the message m is ready to be
received. Let Actτ = Act ∪ {τ}, ranged over by η.
Definition 2.1. A CLTS is a tuple 〈S,Λ,→, s0〉, with S a set of states, Λ ⊆ C
v(Loc) × Actτ , →⊆
S ×Λ×S a transition relation, and s0 ∈ S the initial state. A transition (s, (C, η), s
′) ∈→ is denoted
by s
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′.
Generally speaking, the transition s
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′ expresses that a MANET protocol in state s with an
underlying topology γ ∈ Γ(C) can perform action η to evolve to state s′.
The semantics of broadcast communication is defined to be reliable if and if only the nodes that are
connected to the sender, as defined by its corresponding network constraint, receive the message. We
remark that the status of the links from the receivers to the sender or between two arbitrary receivers
are not of importance and hence, they are abstracted away. Therefore, by constructing such network
constraints through the semantic rules, reliable communication is brought into our framework.
3. Syntax of RRBPT
Let A denotes a countably infinite set of process names which are used as recursion variables in
recursive specifications. Besides network send and receive actions, i.e., nsnd(m, ℓ) and nrcv (m), we
assume protocol send and receive actions, denoted by snd , rcv : Msg , i.e., parametrized by messages.
Furthermore, let IAct be a set of internal actions. The syntax of RRBPT is given by the following
grammar:
t ::= 0 | α.t | t+ t | [[t]]ℓ | t ‖ t | A, A
def
= t | sense(ℓ, t, t) | (νℓ)t | τm(t) | ∂m(t)
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The deadlock process is modeled by 0. The process α.t performs action α and then behaves as process
t, where α is either an internal action or a protocol send/receive action snd(m)/rcv (m). Internal
actions are useful in modeling the interactions of a process with other applications running on the
same node. Protocol send/receive actions specify the interaction of a process with its data-link layer
protocols: these protocols are responsible for transferring messages reliably throughout the network.
These actions are turned into their corresponding network ones via the semantics (see Section 4). The
process t1 + t1 behaves non-deterministically as t1 or t2. The simplest form of a MANET is a node,
represented by the network deployment operator [[t]]ℓ, denoting process t deployed on a node with the
known network address ℓ 6=? (where ? denotes the unknown address). A MANET can be composed
by putting MANETs in parallel using ‖; the nodes communicate with each other by reliable restricted
broadcast. A process name is specified by a recursive equation A
def
= t where A ∈ A is a name.
MANET protocols may behave based on the (non-)existence of a link. A neighbor discovery ser-
vice can be implemented at the data link layer, by periodically sending hello messages and acknowl-
edging such messages received from a neighbor. The sensing operator sense(ℓ′, t1, t2) examines the
status of the link from the node, say with address ℓ, that the sensing is executed on to the node with
the address ℓ′; in case of its existence it behaves as t1, and otherwise as t2. For instance, the term
[[sense(ℓ′, t1, t2)]]ℓ examines the existence of the link ℓ  ℓ
′, and then behaves accordingly. As a
running example, P
def
= sense(B, snd(dataB).P, 0) denotes a process that recursively broadcasts a
data message dataB as long as it is connected to B; and Q
def
= rcv (dataB).deliver .Q a process that
recursively receives a data message data and then the internal action deliver upon successful receipt
of data. The network process [[P ]]A ‖ [[Q]]B specifies an ad hoc network composed of two nodes with
the network addresses A and B deploying processes P and Q, respectively.
The hide operator (νℓ)t conceals the address ℓ in the process t, by renaming this address to ? in
network send/receive actions. For each message m ∈ Msg , the abstraction operator τm(t) renames
network send/receive actions over messages of typem to τ , and the encapsulation operator ∂m(t) for-
bids receiving messages of typem. Let τ{m1,...,mn}(t) and ∂{m1,...,mn}(t) denote τm1(. . . (τmn(t)) . . .)
and ∂m1(. . . (∂mn(t)) . . .).
For example, τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[Q]]B)) specifies an isolated MANET that cannot receive any
message from the environment, while its communications (i.e., send actions) are abstracted away.
Terms should be grammatically well-defined, meaning that processes deployed at a network ad-
dress are only defined by action prefix, choice, sense and process names. Furthermore, the application
of action prefix, choice, sense and process names is restricted to the deployment operator.
4. Semantics of RRBPT
The operational rules in Table 1 induce a CLTS with transitions of the form t
β
−→ t′, where β ∈
Cv(Loc) × Actτ where Act = {NAct ∪ IAct}, NAct denotes the set of network send and receive
actions, and IAct the set of internal actions ranged over by i. Assume that α denotes actions of the
form {rcv (m), snd(m) | m ∈ Msg}. In these rules, t 6
(C, nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ denotes that there exists no t′
such that t
(C′, nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′ and C′ 4 C. The symmetric counterparts of the rules Choice , Bro, and
Par hold, but have been omitted for the brevity.
Rule Prefix assigns an empty network constraint to each prefixed action, which may be accumu-
lated by further constraints through application of rules Rcv1 or Sen1,2. The rule Int indicates that a
6 F. Ghassemi, W. Fokkink / Reliable Restricted Process Theory
Table 1. Semantics of RRBPT operators.
t1
(C,α)
−−−−→ t′1
sense(ℓ, t1, t2)
({ℓ ?}∪C,α)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1
: Sen1
α.t
({},α)
−−−−→ t
: Prefix
t2
(C,α)
−−−−→ t′2
sense(ℓ, t1, t2)
({ℓ 6 ?}∪C,α)
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
: Sen2
t
β
−→ t′
(νℓ)t
β[?/ℓ]
−−−−→ (νℓ)t′
: Hid
t
(C, snd(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′
[[t]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?], nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ
: Snd
t
(C, rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′
[[t]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? ℓ}, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ
: Rcv1
[[t]]ℓ 6
(C, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ ∄C′([[t]]ℓ 6
(C′, nrcv(m)
−−−−−−−−−−→ ∧C 4 C′)
[[t]]ℓ
(C, nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t]]ℓ
: Rcv2
t1
β
−→ t′1
t1 + t2
β
−→ t′1
: Choice
t1
(C1, nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 t2i
(C2, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
t1 ‖ t2
(C1∪C2[ℓ/?], nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′
2
: Bro
t
β
−→ t′
A
β
−→ t′
: Inv , A
def
= t
t1
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 t2
(C2,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
t1 ‖ t2
(C1∪C2,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′
2
: Recv
t
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′
t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′
: Exe, C′ 4 C
t
(C, i)
−−−−→ t′
[[t]]ℓ
(C, i)
−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ
: Int
t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 η ∈ IAct ∪ {τ}
t1 ‖ t2
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t2
: Par
t
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′ η 6= nrcv(m)
∂m(t)
(C,η)
−−−−→ ∂m(t
′)
: Encap
t
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′
τm(t)
(C,τm(η))
−−−−−−−→ τm(t
′)
: Abs
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node progresses when the deployed process on the node performs an internal action. Interaction be-
tween the process t and its data-link layer is specified by the rules Snd and Rcv1,2: when t broadcasts
a message, it is delivered to the nodes in its transmission range, disregarding their readiness. Rcv1
specifies that a process t with an enabled receive action can perform it successfully if it has a link
to a sender (not currently known). If a node does not have any enabled receive action nrcv(m) for
the network constraint C, then receiving the message has no effect on the node behavior, as explained
by Rcv2. This rule also implicitly implies that an enabled receive action cannot be performed when
the node is disconnected from the sender (not currently known). Consequently, this rule makes nodes
input-enabled, meaning that a node not ready to receive a message will drop it. Rule Rcv2 adds a
network receive action (C,nrcv (m)) to the behavior of a network node, specified by [[t]]ℓ, if it has no
transition (C′,nrcv (m)) such that C′ 4 C. Furthermore, this rule ensures that a most general C is
selected, and hence, the receive action nrcv(m) is defined for all possible network constraints (when
combined with rule Exe). Therefore, [[P ]]A has a ({},nrcv (dataB))-transition by application of this
rule.
Rules Sen1,2 explain the behavior of the sense operator. In case there is a link to the node with
the address ℓ from the node that is running the sense operator, and currently its address is unknown,
then it behaves like t1; in case this link is not present, it behaves like t2. Therefore, the link status is
combined with the network constraint C generated by its first or second term argument, as given by
Sen1,2 respectively. For instance, by Prefix and Sen1, P only generates a ({? B}, snd(dataB))-
transition.
In rules Snd and Rcv1, the network constraint C may have the unknown address due to sensing
operators, which is replaced by the address of the deployment operator, i.e., C[ℓ/?]. Therefore, by
applying Snd to the only transition of P , [[P ]]A generates a ({A B},nsnd (dataB))-transition.
Rule Recv synchronizes the receive actions of processes t1 and t2 on message m, while combining
together their (dis)connectivity information in network constraints C1 and C2. Rule Bro specifies how
a communication occurs between a receiving and a sending process. This rule combines the network
constraints, while the unknown location (in the network constraint of the receiving process) is replaced
by the concrete address of the sender. In Bro and Recv it is required that the union of network
constraints on the transition in the conclusion be well-formed.
The rule Par prevents evolution of sub-networks on network actions, in contrast to lossy settings,
and enforces all nodes to specify their localities with respect to the sender before evolving the whole
network via Recv or Bro rules. It only allows a process to evolve by performing an internal or silent
action. Exe explains that a behavior that is possible for a network constraint, is also possible for a
more restrictive network constraint.
For instance, the MANET [[P ]]A ‖ [[Q]]B can generate the ({B A}, nsnd(dataB, A)) transition
induced by the deduction tree below, where y ≡ deliver .Q:
:Prefix
P
({}, snd(dataB))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
:Sen1
P
({? B}, snd(dataB))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ P
:Snd
[[P ]]A
({A B}, nsnd(dataB ,A))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[P ]]A
:Prefix
Q
({}, rcv(dataB))
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ y
:Rcv1
[[Q]]B
({? B}, nrcv(dataB))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[y]]B
:Bro
[[P ]]A ‖ [[Q]]B
({B A}, nsnd(dataB ,A))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[P ]]A ‖ [[y]]B
Rule Hid replaces every occurrence of ℓ in the network constraint and action of β by ?, and hence
hides activities of a node with address ℓ from external observers. According to Abs , the abstraction
operator τm converts all network send and receive actions with a message of type m to τ and leaves
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other actions unaffected, as defined by the function τm(η). The encapsulation operator ∂m disallows
all network receive actions on messages of type m, as specified by Encap.
The semantics of RRBPTwas first introduced in [22] with the aim of defining CLTSs with negative
connectivity pairs to illustrate their benefit for model checking MANET protocols. In this research,
we modify its semantics to properly define the behavior of MANETs in the reliable setting. To this
end, two groups of rules have been modified substantially: those of receive actions and the sensing
operator. More specifically, the operational semantics of receive action in [22] explicitly specifies
the locality of the receiver node with respect to the sender (that could be connected, disconnected, or
unknown) through three semantic rules. Furthermore, the semantics of the sensing operator in [22]
makes [[P ]]A move by ({B 6 A, ? A},nrcv (dataB)) and ({B 6 A, ? 6 A},nrcv (dataB)) to [[0]]A
while here it has a self-loop with the label of ({B 6 A},nrcv (dataB)). In other words, the chance
of sending dataB is lost after dropping a received message of dataB. Such a drawback is resolved by
the newly introduced rule Rcv2 and removing two previous rules of the sensing operator.
5. Rooted Branching Reliable Computed Network Bisimilarity
Terms of the lossy framework RBPT are considered modulo rooted branching computed network
bisimilarity [24]. This equivalence relation is defined using the following notations:
• ⇒ denotes the reflexive and transitive closure of unobservable actions:
– t⇒ t;
– if t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′ for some arbitrary network constraint C and t′ ⇒ t′′, then t⇒ t′′.
• t
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′ iff t
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′ or t
(C[ℓ/?],η[ℓ/?])
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′ and η is of the form nsnd(m, ?) for some m.
Intuitively t⇒ t′ expresses that after a number of communications, t can behave like t′. Furthermore,
an action like ({? B},nsnd(req(?), ?)) can be matched to an action like ({A B},nsnd (req(A), A)),
which is its 〈−〉 counterpart.
Definition 5.1. A binary relation R on RBPT terms is a branching computed network simulation if
t1Rt2 and t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 implies that either:
• η is of the form nrcv (m) or τ , and t′1Rt2; or
• there are t′2 and t
′′
2 such that t2 ⇒ t
′′
2
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′2, where t1Rt
′′
2 and t
′
1Rt
′
2.
R is a branching computed network bisimulation if R and R−1 are branching computed network
simulations. Two terms t1 and t2 are branching computed network bisimilar, denoted by t1 ≃b t2, if
t1Rt2 for some branching computed network bisimulation relation R.
This definition distinguishes process terms according to their abilities to broadcast messages, and
therefore, MANET protocols that can only receive are treated as deadlock as they cannot send any
observable message.
Definition 5.2. Two terms t1 and t are rooted branching computed network bisimilar, written t1 ≃rb
t2, if:
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• t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 implies there is a t
′
2 such that t2
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′2 and t
′
1 ≃b t
′
2;
• t2
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′2 implies there is a t
′
1 such that t1
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′1 and t
′
1 ≃b t
′
2.
Rooted branching computed network bisimilarity does not constitute a congruence with respect
to the RRBPT operators. We still want that a receiving MANET (after its first action) be equivalent
to deadlock. In this setting, still [[0]]A ≃b [[rcv(m).0]]A, but [[0]]A ‖ [[snd(m).0]]B 6≃b [[rcv (m).0]]A ‖
[[snd(m).0]]B , since by application of Rcv 1,2, Snd , and Bro:
[[rcv (m).0]]A ‖ [[snd(m).0]]B
({B 6 A},nsnd(m,B))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[rcv(m).0]]A ‖ [[0]]B
[[rcv (m).0]]A ‖ [[snd(m).0]]B
({B A},nsnd(m,B))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[0]]A ‖ [[0]]B
while by application of Rcv2, Snd , Bro:
[[0]]A ‖ [[snd(m).0]]B
({},nsnd(m,B))
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[0]]A ‖ [[0]]B
which cannot be matched to any transition of [[rcv (m).0]]A ‖ [[snd(m).0]]B according to the second
condition of Definition 5.1. However, we observe that the ({},nsnd (m, B))-transition can be matched
to the transition sets of actions ({B 6 A},nsnd(m, B)) and ({B A},nsnd(m, B)), as the network
constraints {B 6 A} and {B  A} provide a partitioning of {} while the resulting states of their
corresponding transitions are equivalent. Thus, we revise our Definition 5.1 by generalizing its second
condition.
Intuitively, two MANETs are equivalent if they have the same observable behaviors for all possi-
ble underlying topologies. In the lossy setting, the observable behaviors exclude receive actions, as
the node [[rcv (a).snd(a).0]]A can be distinguished from [[rcv (a).0]]A due to its capability to send a
after its receipt. However, the capability of receiving messages implicitly defines a restriction on the
underlying topology. For instance, the sending action snd(a) in [[rcv(a).snd (a).0]]A is only possible
if the node in question was previously connected to a sender and successfully received a. Thus to
distinguish [[rcv(a).snd(a).0]]A from [[snd(a).0]]A, receive actions are included in the observables in
the reliable setting. Furthermore, as dropping a message may have the same effect as its process-
ing (as explained above), a transition cannot be matched in the same way as in Definition 5.1 and it
may be matched to multiple transitions. A partitioning of a network constraint C consists of network
constraints C1, . . . , Cn such that ∀i, j ≤ n (i 6= j ⇒ Γ(Ci) ∩ Γ(Cj) = ∅) ∧
⋃n
k=1 Γ(Ck) = Γ(C).
Definition 5.3. A binary relation R on RRBPT terms is a branching reliable computed network sim-
ulation if t1 R t2 and t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 imply that either:
• η is a τ action, and t′1 R t2; or
• there are s′′1 , . . . , s
′′
k and s
′
1, . . . , s
′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k(t2 ⇒ s
′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′i, with
t1 R s
′′
i and t
′
1 R s
′
i), and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 constitute a partitioning of 〈C〉.
R is a branching reliable computed network bisimulation if R and R−1 are branching reliable com-
puted network simulations. Two terms t1 and t2 are branching reliable computed network bisimilar,
denoted by t1 ≃br t2, if t1 R t2 for some branching reliable computed network bisimulation relation
R.
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Trivially (t1 ≃b t2) ⇒ (t1 ≃br t2).
Theorem 5.4. Branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence.
See Section A for the proof of this theorem.
Definition 5.5. Two terms t1 and t are rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilar, written
t1 ≃rbr t2, if:
• t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 implies there is a t
′
2 such that t2
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′2 and t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2;
• t2
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′2 implies there is a t
′
1 such that t1
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′1 and t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2.
Corollary 5.6. Rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence.
Corollary 5.6 is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5.4 and Definition 5.5.
Theorem 5.7. Rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is a congruence for RRBPT
operators.
See Section B for the proof.
6. Axiomatization for RRBPT
To provide a sound and complete axiomatization for closed RRBPT terms with respect to rooted
branching reliable computed network bisimilarity, the framework should be extended with the com-
puted network terms, i.e., (C, η).t which expresses that action η is possible for topologies belonging to
C, in the same way as [24]. This prefix operator is helpful to transform protocol send/receive actions
into their corresponding network ones. Furthermore, it borrows the operators left merge ( ) and com-
munication merge from the process algebra ACP [29] to axiomatize parallel composition. Note that
the interleaving semantics for parallel composition is only valid for internal and unobservable actions
(see rule Par ). To axiomatize the behavior of nodes while being input-enabled, we also exploit two
novel auxiliary operators.
RRBPT is extended with new operators and called Reliable Computed Network Process Theory
(RCNT). Its syntax contains:
t ::= 0 | β.t | t+ t | A ,A
def
= t | t | t | t t | t ‖ t | recA · t
sense(ℓ, t, t) | (νℓ)t | τm(t) | ∂m(t) | ℓ : t : t | C ⊲ t | [[t]]ℓ
The prefix operator in β.t again denotes a process which performs β and then behaves as t. The
action β can now be of two types: either an internal action or a send/receive action snd(m)/rcv (m),
denoted by α, or actions of the form (C,nrcv (m)), (C,nsnd(m, ℓ)) and (C, τ), denoted by (C, η),
where the first two actions are called the network receive and send actions, respectively. The new
operator ℓ : t1 : t2, so-called local deployment, defines the behavior of process t2 deployed at the
network address ℓ while it only considers the input-enabledness feature with regard to the behavior of
t2. In cases that it should drop a message (i.e., processing the message has not been defined by t2), it
behaves as t1. This operator is helpful to axiomatize the behavior of the deployment operator in the
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reliable setting. To axiomatize the behavior of the sense operator, the framework is extended with the
topology restriction operator C ⊲ t which restricts the behavior of t by taking restrictions of C into
account.
Due to the input-enabledness feature of nodes, their behavior is recursive: upon receiving a mes-
sage for which no receive action has been defined, a node drops the message. To this aim, we exploit
the recursion operator recA · t, which specifies the solution of the process name A, defined by the
equation A
def
= t. The process term tA is a solution of the equation A
def
= t if the replacement of A
by tA on both sides of the equation results in equal terms, i.e. tA ≃rb t[tA/A]. As we are interested
in equations with exactly one solution, we define a guardedness criterion for network names, in the
same way as [24]. A free occurrence of a network name A in t is called guarded if this occurrence
is in the scope of an action prefix operator (not (C, τ) prefix) and not in the scope of an abstraction
operator [30]; in other words, there is a subterm (C, η).t′ in t such that η 6= τ , and A occurs in t′. A
is (un)guarded in t if (not) every free occurrence of A in t is guarded. A RCNT term t is guarded if
for every subterm recA · t′, A is guarded in t′. This guardedness criterion ensures that any guarded
recursive term has a unique solution.
A term is grammatically well-defined if its processes deployed at a network address through either
a network or local deployment operator, are only defined by action prefix, choice, sense, and process
names.
The operational semantic rules of the new operators are given in Table 2 while the counterpart of
Sync2 holds. In these rules, t 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→ denotes that there exists no t′ such that t
(C′, rcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′ for
some network constraint C′. The behavior of the local deployment operator is almost similar to the de-
ployment operator. Its rules Inter ′1 and Inter
′
2 are the same as Snd and Rcv1, respectively. However,
it substitutes Inter ′3 for Rcv2 by which it only adds transitions containing the disconnectivity pair
? 6 ℓ for those possible receive actions of t2 (generated by Rcv1). Rules Sen3,4 make the behavior of
sense(ℓ′, t1, t2) input-enabled toward receive actions that are possible by t1 but not t2 and vice versa.
The constraints of the topology restriction operator C ⊲ t is added to the behaviors of t as explained
by the rule TR.
The main differences of extended RCNT with CNT are that its deployed nodes are input-enabled
and its communication primitive is reliable. We use the notation
∑
m∈M t to define t[m1/m] + . . . +
t[mk/m], whereM = {m1, . . . ,mk}. Furthermore, if (b, t1, t2) behaves as t1 if the condition b holds
and otherwise as t2.
The axioms regarding the choice, deployment, left and communication merge, and parallel op-
erators are given in Table 3. The axioms Ch1−4, Br , LM 2,3 and S1−4 are standard (cf. [31]). The
axiom Ch5 denotes that a network send action whose sender address is unknown can be removed if
its counterpart action exists. The axiom Ch6 explains that a more liberal network constraint allows
more behavior. Axioms Dep0−7, LM
′
1,2, and TRes1−5 are new in comparison with the lossy setting
of [24]. The axiom (C, η).t1 t2 = (C, η).(t1 ‖ t2) has been replaced by LM
′
1,2 which only allow
internal or unobservable actions of the left operand to be performed.
To axiomatize the behavior of a node considering the input-enabledness feature, we need to find the
messages that it cannot currently respond to and then add a summand which receives those message
without processing them. To this aim, axiom Dep0 expresses the behavior of [[t]]ℓ as a recursive
specification which drops messages that it does not handle with the help of the auxiliary function
Message(t,S), and the behavior of t with the help of the local deployment operator ℓ : Q : t. The
functionMessage(t,S) returns the set of messages that can be currently processed by t and is defined
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Table 2. Semantics of the new operators of RCNT
t2
(C, snd(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
ℓ : t1 : t2
(C[ℓ/?], nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′2]]ℓ
: Inter ′1
t[recA · t/A]
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′
recA · t
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′
: Rec
t2
(C, rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′2
ℓ : t1 : t2
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? ℓ}, nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′2]]ℓ
: Inter ′2
t2
(C, rcv (m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′2
ℓ : t1 : t2
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? 6 ℓ}, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t1
: Inter ′3
t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′
C ⊲ t
(C′∪C,η)
−−−−−−−→ t′
: TR
t1 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→ t2
(C, rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′2
ℓ : t3 : sense(ℓ
′, t1, t2)
({? ℓ′}∪C, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t3
: Sen3
t1
(C, rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′1 t2 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→
ℓ : t3 : sense(ℓ
′, t1, t2)
({? 6 ℓ′}∪C, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t3
: Sen4
t1
β
−→ t′1
t1 t2
β
−→ t′1 ‖ t2
: LExe
t1
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 t2
(C2,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
t1 | t2
(C1∪C2,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′
2
: Sync1
t1
(C1,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 t2
(C2,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2
t1 | t2
(C1∪C2[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′
2
: Sync2
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using structural induction:
Message(0,S) = ∅
Message(i.t,S) = ∅, i ∈ IAct
Message(snd(m).t,S) = ∅
Message(rcv (m).t,S) = {m}
Message(t1 + t2,S) = Message(t1,S) ∪Message(t2,S)
Message(sense(ℓ, t1, t2),S) = Message(t1,S) ∪Message(t2,S)
Message(A,S) = Message(t,S ∪ {A}), A 6∈ S,A
def
= t
Message(A,S) = ∅, A ∈ S
where S keeps track of process names whose right-hand definitions have been examined. We remark
that Dep0 extends the deployment behavior of the lossy setting with the input enabledness feature
with the help of operator ℓ : Q : t. The axioms Dep1−7 specify the behavior of the operator ℓ :
t1 : t2. Axiom Dep1 defines the interaction between the network and data link layers. The protocol
send action (at the network layer) is transformed into its network version (at the data link layer).
Axiom Dep2 indicates that when ℓ is connected to a sender (which is unknown yet), the receive
action is successful and its behavior proceeds as [[t]]ℓ. Otherwise, the receive action is unsuccessful
and its behavior is defined by t′. Axioms Dep3,4,5 express the effect of the local deployment on
choice, deadlock, and process names, respectively while axiomsDep6,7 define its effect on the prefixed
internal actions and sense operator, respectively.
The behavior of the topology restriction operator is defined by the axioms TRes1−5 in Table 3.
Axiom TRes1 considers the restrictions of C1 by integrating its restrictions with C2 in the computed
network term (C2, η).t if C1 ∪ C2 is well-formed. Axiom TRes2 defines that topology restriction can
be distributed over the choice operator. Axiom TRes3 expresses that the topology restriction operator
can be moved inside and outside of a recursion operator. Axioms TRes4,5 explain that the topology
restriction operator has no effect on a process name and deadlock, respectively.
For instance, the behavior of theMANET [[P ]]A, where P
def
= sense(B, snd(dataB).P, 0),Msg =
{dataB}, is simplified as:
[[P ]]A =
Dep0,5
recQ · ({},nrcv (dataB)).Q+A : Q : sense(B, snd(dataB).P, 0) =
Dep7
recQ · ({},nrcv (dataB)).Q+ {A B}⊲A : Q : snd(dataB).P + {A 6 B}⊲A : Q : 0 =
Dep1,4
recQ · ({},nrcv (dataB)).Q+ {A B}⊲ ({},nsnd (dataB, A)).Q + {B 6 A}⊲ 0 =
TRes1,5
recQ · ({},nrcv (dataB)).Q+ ({A B},nsnd (dataB, A)).Q
The behavior of [[Q]]B , where Q
def
= rcv (dataB).deliver .Q, is equated to:
[[Q]]B =
Dep0,5
recQ ·A : Q : rcv(dataB).deliver .Q =
Dep2
recQ · ({? B},nrcv (dataB)).[[deliver .Q]]A + ({? 6 B},nrcv (dataB)).Q
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Table 3. Axioms for the choice, deployment, left and communication merge, and parallel operators. The sets
M1 andM2 denoteMessage(t2, ∅) \Message(t1, ∅) andMessage(t1, ∅) \Message(t2, ∅) respectively.
Ch1 0 + t = t Ch2 t1 + t2 = t2 + t1
Ch3 t1 + (t2 + t3) = (t1 + t2) + t3 Ch4 t+ t = t
Ch5 (C, nsnd(m, ?)).t+ 〈(C, nsnd(m, ?))〉.t = 〈(C, nsnd(m, ?))〉.t
Ch6 (C1, η).t+ (C2, η).t = (C1, η).t, C2 4 C1
Dep0 [[t]]ℓ = recQ ·
∑
m
′ 6∈Message(t,∅)({}, nrcv(m
′)).Q+ ℓ : Q : t
Dep2 ℓ : t
′ : rcv(m).t = ({? 6 ℓ}, nrcv(m)).t′ + ({? ℓ}, nrcv(m)).[[t]]ℓ
Dep7 ℓ : t3 : sense(ℓ
′, t1, t2) =
∑
m
′∈M1
({ℓ ℓ′}, nrcv(m′)).t3
+
∑
m
′∈M2
({ℓ 6 ℓ′}, nrcv(m′)).t3 + {ℓ ℓ′}⊲ ℓ : t3 : t1 + {ℓ 6 ℓ′}⊲ ℓ : t3 : t2
Dep1 ℓ : t
′ : snd(m).t = ({}, nsnd(m, ℓ)).[[t]]ℓ Dep6 ℓ : t
′ : i.t = ({}, i).[[t]]ℓ
Dep3 ℓ : t3 : t1 + t2 = ℓ : t3 : t1 + ℓ : t3 : t2 Dep4 ℓ : t : 0 = 0
Dep5 ℓ : t
′ : A = ℓ : t′ : t, A
def
= t
TRes1 C1 ⊲ (C2, η).t = (C1 ∪ C2, η).t, if C1 ∪ C2 ∈ Cv(Loc)
TRes2 C ⊲ (t1 + t2) = (C ⊲ t1) + (C ⊲ t2) TRes3 C ⊲ recA · t = recA · (C ⊲ t)
TRes4 C ⊲ A = A TRes5 C ⊲ 0 = 0
Br t1 ‖ t2 = t1 t2 + t2 t1 + t1 | t2 S1 t1 | t2 = t2 | t1
LM ′1 (C, η).t1 t2 = 0, η 6∈ IAct ∪ {τ} S2 (t1 + t2) | t3 = t1 | t3 + t2 | t3
LM 2 (t1 + t2) t3 = t1 t3 + t2 t3 S3 0 | t = 0
LM 3 0 t = 0 S4 (C, η).t1 | t2 = 0, η ∈ IAct ∪ {τ}
LM ′2 (C, η).t1 t2 = (C, η).(t1 ‖ t2), η ∈ IAct ∪ {τ}
Sync1 (C1, nsnd(m1, ℓ)).t1 | (C2, nrcv(m2)).t2 =
if ((m1 = m2), (C1 ∪ C2[ℓ/?], nsnd(m1, ℓ)).t1 ‖ t2, 0)
Sync2 (C1, nrcv(m1)).t1 | (C2, nrcv(m2)).t2 = if ((m1 = m2), (C1 ∪ C2, nrcv(m1)).t1 ‖ t2, 0)
Sync3 (C1, nsnd(m1, ℓ1)).t1 | (C2, nsnd(m2, ℓ2)).t2 = 0
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Table 4. Axiomatization of hiding, abstraction and encapsulation operators.
Res1 (νℓ)(t1 + t2) = (νℓ)t1 + (νℓ)t2 Res3 (νℓ)0 = 0
Res2 (νℓ)(C, η).t = (C[?/ℓ], η[?/ℓ]).(νℓ)t
Ecp1 ∂m((C, nsnd(m, ℓ)).t) = (C, nsnd(m, ℓ)).∂m(t)
Ecp2 ∂m((C, nrcv(m)).t) = if ((m 6= m), (C, nrcv(m)).∂m(t), 0)
Abs1 τm((C, nrcv(m)).t) = if ((m = m), (C, τ).τm(t), (C, nrcv(m)).τm(t))
Abs2 τm((C, nsnd(m, ℓ)).t) = if ((m = m), (C, τ).τm(t), (C, nsnd(m, ℓ)).τm(t))
Abs3 τm(t1 + t2) = τm(t1) + τm(t2) Ecp3 ∂m(t1 + t2) = ∂m(t1) + ∂m(t2)
Abs4 τm(0) = 0 Ecp4 ∂m(0) = 0
T1 (C′, η).((C1, η).t+ (C2, η).t+ t′) = (C′, η).((C, η).t+ t′)
iff ∃ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ Loc, ∃C ∈ Cv(Loc) · (C1 = C ∪ {ℓ ℓ′} ∧ C2 = C ∪ {ℓ 6 ℓ′}
T2 (C, η).((C′, τ).(t1 + t2) + t2) = (C, η).(t1 + t2)
The axioms of hiding and encapsulation are given in Table 4. Axiom T1 accumulates the network
constraints that constitute a partitioning while T2 removes a τ action which preserves the behavior of
a network after some topology changes. The remaining axioms in this table are similar to the lossy
setting.
Axioms for process names are given in Table 5. Unfold andFold express existence and uniqueness
of a solution for the equation A
def
= t, which correspond to Milner’s standard axioms, and the Recursive
Definition Principle (RDP) and Recursive Specification Principle (RSP) in ACP. Unfold states that
each recursive operator has a solution (whether it is guarded or not), while Fold states that each
guarded recursive operator has at most one solution.
The behavior of τMsg(∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[Q]]B)) by using the axioms of Table 5 is expressed by:
τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]B ‖ [[Q]]B)) =
recQ · ({A B}, τ).({}, deliver ).Q+ ({A 6 B}, τ).0
which explains that in case A is connected to B, each sending of dataB is followed by the internal
action deliver
It is not hard to see that the axioms of Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 provide a sound axiomatization
of RCNT. This can be checked by verifying soundness for each axiom individually.
Theorem 6.1. The axiomatization is sound, i.e. for all closed RCNT terms t1 and t2, if t1 = t2 then
t1 ≃rb t2.
Our axiomatization is also ground-complete for terms with a finite-state CLTS, but not for infinite-
state CLTSs. For example, recW · ({},nsnd (req(A), A)).W ‖
∑
lx:Loc({? B},nrcv (req(lx))).W
produces an infinite-state CLTS, since at each recursive call a new parallel operator is generated. Its
equality to recH · ({},nsnd (req(A), A)).H cannot be proved by our axiomatization.
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Table 5. Axioms for process names.
recA · t = t{recA · t/A} Unfold
t1 = t2{t1/A} ⇒ t1 = recA · t2, if A is guarded in t2 Fold
recA · (A + t) = recA · t Ung
recA · ((C, τ).((C′, τ).t′ + t) + s) = WUng1
recA · ((C, τ).(t′ + t) + s), if A is unguarded in t′
recA · ((C, τ).(A + t) + s) = recA · ((C, τ).(t+ s) + s) WUng2
τm(recA · t) = recA · τm(t), if A is serial in t Hid
Theorem 6.2. The axiomatization is ground-complete, i.e., for all closed finite-state reliable com-
puted network terms t1 and t2, t1 ≃rb t2 implies t1 = t2.
See sections C and D for the proofs of theorems 6.1 and 6.2, respectively.
7. Case Study
In MANETs, nodes communicate through others via a multi-hop communication. Hence, nodes act
as routers to make the communication possible among not directly connected nodes. We illustrate the
applicability of our axioms in the analysis of MANET protocols through a simple routing protocol
inspired by the AODV protocol.
7.1. Protocol Specification
The protocol consists of three processes P , M , and Q, each specifying the behavior of a node as the
source (that finds a route to a specific destination), middle node (that relays messages from the source
to the destination), and destination. The description of these process are given in Figure 1.
P
def
= sense(B, snd(dataB).P, snd(req).P1)
P1
def
= [rcv(repC).P2 + rcv(repB).P + snd(req).P1]
P2
def
= sense(C, rcv (error).P + snd(dataC).P2, snd(req).P1)
M
def
= rcv(req).snd(req).M1
M1
def
= rcv(repB).snd(repC).M2 + snd(req).M1
M2
def
= sense(B, rcv(dataC).snd(dataB).M2, snd(error).snd(req).M1)
Q
def
= rcv(req).snd(repB).Q+ rcv(dataB).deliver.Q
Figure 1. The specification of processes P ,M , and Q as a part of our simple routing protocol.
Process P , deployed at the address A, uses the neighbor discovery service of the data link layer to
examine if it has a direct link to the destination with the address B. If it is connected, then it sends its
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data directly by broadcasting the message dataB ; otherwise, it initiates the route discovery procedure
by sending the message req , then behaving as P1. This process waits until it receives a reply from
a middle name with the address C or B. In the former case, it behaves as P2 which indicates that
A sends it data through C as long as C is connected to A. In the latter case, it behaves as P which
indicates that A sends it data as long as B is directly connected to A.
Process M relays req messages to find a route to B and then behaves as M1. This process waits
until it receives a reply. To model waits with a timeout, it non-deterministically sends a request again.
Upon receiving a reply from C it behaves as M2, indicating that it relays data messages of A as long
as it has a link to C . Finally, process Q sends a reply upon receiving a request message and receives
data messages.
To simplify the route maintenance procedure of AODV, the middle node takes advantage of the
sensing operator when it behaves as M2. Whenever it finds out that it has no link to C , it sends an
error message to its upstream node, i.e., A, to inform it that its route to B through C is not valid.
Afterwards, they both execute the route discovery procedure by sending a request message.
The network with the three nodes of a source, middle, and destination is specified by
N ≡ τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)).
Analyzing (νA)(νB)(νC)N , whose network addresses have been abstracted away, reveals that it is
rooted branching bisimilar to recX · τ.deliver .X + τ.0. Thus, possibly a deadlock occurs where data
is not delivered to B. Such behavior may be the result of a conceptual mistake in the protocol design
or lossy communication between A and B. However, the latter one does not exist in our reliable
setting. We propose a technique in Section 7.2 to discover only those faulty behaviors that are due to
an incorrect protocol design.
The network ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) can be simplified as:
∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) = (1)
({A B},nsnd (dataB , A)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[deliver .Q]]B)+
({A 6 B,A C},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
({A 6 B,A 6 C},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
Next, we simplify ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) as
∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) = (2)
({A B},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)+
({A 6 B},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
({C B},nsnd(req , C)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)+
({C 6 B},nsnd(req , C)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
Now, we continue by extending ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B):
∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B) =
({ },nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)+
({ },nsnd(req , C)).∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)+
({B A,C},nsnd(repB, B)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
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({B A,B 6 C},nsnd(repB , B)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
({B 6 A,B C},nsnd(repB , B)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
By simplifying the term ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B), which indicates that A and C
have found a direct route to B, we reach ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B):
∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) =
({ },nsnd(repC , C)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
({A B},nsnd (dataB , A)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[deliver .Q]]B)+
({A 6 B},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
By extending ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B), we have:
∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) =
({A B},nsnd (dataB , A)).∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[deliver .Q]]B)+
({A 6 B},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
Finally extending ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) results:
∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B) =
({A B},nsnd (req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)+
({A 6 B},nsnd(req , A)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)+
({C 6 B},nsnd(error , C)).∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B).
The following scenario, found by above equations, is valid for a topology in which A has only a
multi-hop link to B via C , but B has a direct link to A:
∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
({A6 B,A C},nsnd(req ,A))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
({C B},nsnd (req ,C))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)
({B A,C},nsnd(repB ,B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[snd(repC).M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
({ },nsnd(repC ,C))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
({A6 B},nsnd(req ,A))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
({A6 B},nsnd(req ,A))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M2]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)
. . .
The reason is found in the specification of M2 which does not handle request messages, and hence,
for such a topology no data will be received by B although there is a path form A to B and from B to
A. Therefore, we reviseM2 as:
M2
def
= sense(B, rcv(dataC).snd(dataB).M2 + rcv(req).snd(repC).M2,
snd(error).snd(req).M1)
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The path above also exists in the lossy setting, but with all disconnectivity pairs removed from
the network constraints. However, an exhaustive and therefore expensive inspection of this path is
needed to determine that it is due to a design error. The first transition carries the label ({A 6 
B,A C},nsnd(req , A)) in the reliable setting, meaning that B is not ready to receive, and the label
({A C},nsnd(req , A)) in the lossy setting. The latter label indicates that either B was not ready
to receive or it was not connected to A. So in the lossy setting one has to examine the origin state to
find out if B had an enabled receive action or not. The concept of not being ready to receive is treated
in the same way as a lossy communication. Since only the former may be due to a conceptual design
in the protocol, finding design errors is not straightforward in the lossy setting. In general the lossy
setting will produce a large number of possible error traces that all need to be examined exhaustively,
while the reliable setting will produce no spurious error traces.
7.2. Protocol Analysis
The properties of wireless protocols, specially MANETs, tends to be weaker in comparison with wired
protocols. For instance, the simple property of packet delivery from node A to B is specified as “if
there is a path from A toB for a long enough period of time, any packet sent by A, will be received by
B” [21]. The topology-dependent behavior of communication, and consequently the need for multi-
hop communication between nodes, make their properties preconditioned by the existence of some
paths among nodes.
To investigate the topology-dependent properties of MANETs by equational reasoning, it is nec-
essary to enrich our process theory RCNT to specify behaviors constrained by multi-hop constraints.
To this aim, we extend the action prefix operator of RCNT with actions that are paired with multi-hop
constraints, first introduced in [22] and here extended by negative multi-hop connectivity pairs. View-
ing a network topology as a directed graph, a multi-hop constraint is represented as a set of multi-hop
(dis)connectivity pairs 99K: Loc × Loc and 699K: Loc × Loc . For instance, A 99K C denotes there
exists a multi-hop connection from A to C , and consequently C can indirectly receive data from A.
LetM(Loc) denote the set of multi-hop constraints that can be defined over network addresses in Loc,
ranged over by M. Term (M, ι).t, where ι ∈ IAct ∪ {τ}, denotes that the action ι is possible if
the underlying topology satisfies the multi-hop network constraint M. Formally, a topology like γ
satisfies the multi-hop network constraint M, denoted by γ |=M iff for each ℓ 99K ℓ′ inM, there is
a multi-hop connection from ℓ to ℓ′ in γ, and for each ℓ 699K ℓ′ inM, there is no multi-hop connection
from ℓ to ℓ′ in γ. To define a well-formed RCNT term, the rule which restricts the application of
the new prefixed-actions to sequential processes, is added to the previous ones. Furthermore, a term
cannot have two summands such that one is prefixed by an action of the form (C, η) and the other by
an action of the form (M, ι). So terms with an action of the form (M, ι) only contain action prefix
(with multi-hop constraints), choice and recursion operators.
To reason about the correctness of a MANET protocol, its behavior can be abstractly specified
by observable internal actions with the required conditions on the underlying topology, i.e., ι-actions
with multi-hop constraints. Intuitively, each communication of a protocol implementation triggers an
internal action. Such communications are abstracted away by τ -transitions. Therefore, we define a
novel preorder relation to examine if a protocol refines its specification. To this aim, a sequence of
τ -transitions is allowed to precede an action that is matched to an action of the specification, as long
as the accumulated network constraints of the τ -transitions satisfy the multi-hop network constraint
of the matched action. Hence our preorder relation is parametrized by a network constraint to reflect
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such accumulated network constraints.
To provide such a relation, we use the notation
C
=⇒ which is the reflexive and transitive closure of
τ -relations while their network constraints are accumulated:
• t
{ }
==⇒ t;
• if t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′ for some arbitrary network constraint C and t′
C′
=⇒ t′′, then t
C′∪C
===⇒ t′′, where C′∪C
is well-formed.
Furthermore, the network constraint C satisfies the multi-hop constraint C, denoted by C |= M iff
∃ γ ∈ Γ(C) (γ |= M). We remark that a network constraint like {A 6 B} may satisfy both {A 99K
B} and {A 699K B}, but {A B} only satisfies {A 99K B}.
Definition 7.1. A binary relation RC on RCNT terms is a refinement relation if tRC s implies:
• if t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′, where C ∪ C′ ∈ Cv(Loc), then
– η = τ and t′ RC∪C′ s with C ∪ C
′ |=M, or
– there is an s′ such that s
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′, and t′ RC∪C′ s
′, and C ∪ C′ |=M, or
– η = ι for some ι ∈ IAct ∪ {τ} and there is an s′ such that s
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′ with t′ RC∪C′ s
′;
• if s
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′, then there are t′′ and t′ such that t
C′
=⇒ t′′
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′ with t′′ RC∪C′ s and
t′ RC∪C′∪C′′ s
′;
• if s
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′, then there is a t′ such that t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′ with t′ RC∪C′ s
′.
The protocol t refines the specification s, denoted by t ⊑ s, if t R{ } s for some refinement relation
R{ }.
Theorem 7.2. Refinement is a preorder relation and has the precongruence property.
See Section E for its proof. To analyze the correctness of our simple routing protocol, we investigate
if it has the packet delivery property. To this end, we verify whether τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖
[[Q]]B)) refines S, where S
def
= ({A 99K B,B 99K A}, deliver ).S + ({A 699K B}, τ).0 + ({A 99K
B,B 699K A}, τ).0. To this aim, we match all the resulting terms of τ -transitions to S as long as
their accumulated network constraints satisfy {A 99K B,B 99K A}. If a τ -transition violates {A 99K
B,B 99K A} but satisfies {A 699K B}, then it will be matched to the transition ({A 699K B}, τ).
Otherwise, it will be matched to the transition ({A 99K B,B 699K A}, τ). Therefore, we exploit the
provided equations together with the precongruence property of our refinement for the choice operator
and the rules of Proposition 7.3.
Proposition 7.3. Suppose ι ∈ IAct . The following rules holds
(C, τ).t ⊑ (M, ι).s⇔ C ⊲ t ⊑ (M, ι).s ∧ C |=M
(C, ι).t ⊑ (M, ι).s⇔ C ⊲ t ⊑ s
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These rules correspond to the transfer conditions of Definition 7.1, and their proofs are discussed in
Section E.
Thus, we use Equation 1 to show that:
τMsg(∂Msg ([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ S⇔
{A B}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[deliver .Q]]B)) ⊑ S∧
{A 6 B,A C}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ S∧ (3)
{A 6 B,A 6 C}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ 0
To prove the refinement relation 3, we use the Equation 2 to show that
{A 6 B,A C}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg (P1]]A ‖ [[snd(req).M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ S⇔
{A 6 B,A C,C B}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[snd(repB).Q]]B)) ⊑ S∧
{A 6 B,A C,C 6 B}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ 0 (4)
This proof process stops when we reach to the predicate C ⊲ t ⊑ (M, ι).s to prove for which either
we have previously examined C′ ⊲ t ⊑ (M, ι).s where C 4 C′, or it holds trivially. For instance, the
refinement relation (4) trivially holds as it can be proved with the help of our axiomatization, especially
the rules Fold and TRes1,2, that {A 6 B,A C,C 6 B}⊲ τMsg(∂Msg ([[P1]]A ‖ [[M1]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) is
the answer to the equation Q
def
= ({A 6 B,A C,C 6 B}, τ).Q, and trivially
recQ · ({A 6 B,A C,C 6 B}, τ).Q ⊑ 0.
So, it can be easily proved that τMsg(∂Msg([[P ]]A ‖ [[M ]]C ‖ [[Q]]B)) ⊑ S .
8. Related Work
Related calculi to ours are CBS# [13], CWS [32], CMAN [14, 15], CMN [16] and its timed version
[33], bKlaim [17], ω-calculus [18], SCWN [19], CSDT [20], AWN [21] and its timed extension
[34], and the broadcast psi-calculi [35]. These approaches have already been compared in [24] with
regard to modeling issues, such as topology and mobility, as well as behavioral congruence relations,
in particular observables and distinguishing power. As all these approaches, except [32], focus on
protocols above the data like layer, we investigate their capabilities to faithfully support the properties
of wireless communication at this layer, i.e., being non-blocking and asynchronous. Furthermore, we
compare our behavioral equivalence relation to those with a reliable setting.
All these approaches, except [5], provide an algebraic framework. Among them only [17] is
asynchronous, centered around the tuple space paradigm; broadcast messages are output into the tuple
spaces of neighboring nodes to the sending node.
The non-blocking property is a consequence of either nodes being input-enabled or the commu-
nication primitives being lossy. In the former case, the asynchronous property is achieved through
abstract data specifications [36] in line with the approach from [37, 38], in which the sum operator
plays a pivotal role. Each process is then parametrized by a variable of the queue type with a sum-
mand which receives all possible messages (if the queue is empty). Among these approaches, CMN,
CMAN, ω-calculus, SCWN, and the broadcast psi-calculi are lossy.
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To make a process input-enabled while communication is synchronous, three approaches are fol-
lowed. In the first approach, followed by AWN, the semantics is equipped with a rule similar to our
Rcv2 with a negative premise which expresses that if a node is not ready to receive, the message
is simply ignored [21]. Due to our implicit modeling of topology, the negative premise of our rule
is more complicated to characterize the unreadiness of nodes regarding the underlying topology. In
the second approach, followed by CDST, counterparts for the rules Bro and Recv are defined with
negative premises to cover cases when a process cannot participate in the communication message
[20]. The third approach, provided by CSB#, eliminates negative premises, to remain within the de
Simone format of structural operational semantics [21], in favor of actions which discard messages
[13]. Therefore, the semantics is augmented by rules that trigger the ignore actions for any sending
node, receiving nodes for disconnected locations, and deadlock. Furthermore, the rules Bro and Recv
are modified to cover cases when a process ignores a message.
Among the reliable settings, only CDST provides a behavioral equivalence relation, based on the
notion of observational congruence: the receive and send actions are observable while transitions
changing the underlying topology are treated as unobservable. However, due to implicit modeling
of topology and mobility, our behavioral equivalence relation has been parametrized with network
constraints while it considers the branching structure of MANETs.
9. Conclusion
We introduced the reliable framework RRBPT, suitable to specify and verify MANETs, with the aim to
catch errors in design decisions. We discussed the required changes at the semantic model by extend-
ing the network constraints with negative connectivity links. Furthermore, we revised the equivalence
relation of the lossy setting to preserve required behavior in the reliable framework. Then we demon-
strated which axioms should be added to /removed from the reliable setting. We provided an analysis
approach at the syntactic level, exploiting a precongruence relation and our axiomatization. We ap-
plied our analysis approach to a simple routing protocol to prove that it correctly finds routes among
connected nodes.
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A. Branching Reliable Computed Network Bisimilarity is an Equiva-
lence
To prove that branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence, we exploit semi-
branching reliable computed network bisimilarity, following [41].
Definition A.1. A binary relation R on computed network terms is a semi-branching reliable com-
puted network simulation, if t1Rt2 implies whenever t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1:
• either η = τ and there is a t′2 such that t2 ⇒ t
′
2 with t1Rt
′
2 and t
′
1Rt
′
2; or
• there are s′′1, . . . , s
′′
k and s
′
1, . . . , s
′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t2 ⇒ s
′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′i, with
t1Rs
′′
i and t
′
1Rs
′
i), and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 constitute a partitioning of 〈C〉.
R is a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation if R and R−1 are semi-branching
reliable computed network simulations. Computed networks t1 and t2 are semi-branching reliable
computed network bisimilar if t1Rt2, for some semi-branching reliable computed network bisimula-
tion relation R.
Lemma A.2. Let t1 and t2 be computed network terms, and R a semi-branching reliable computed
network bisimulation such that t1Rt2.
• If t1 ⇒ t
′
1 then ∃t
′
2 · t2 ⇒ t
′
2 ∧ t
′
1Rt
′
2
• If t2 ⇒ t
′
2 then ∃t
′
1 · t1 ⇒ t
′
1 ∧ t
′
1Rt
′
2
Proof:
We only give the proof of the first property. The second property can be proved in a similar fashion.
The proof is by induction on the number of⇒ steps from t1 to t
′
1:
• Base: Assume that the number of steps equals zero. Then t1 and t
′
1 must be equal. Since t1Rt2
and t2 ⇒ t2, the property is satisfied.
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• Induction step: Assume t1 ⇒ t
′
1 in n steps, for some n ≥ 1. Then there is t
′′
1 such that t1 ⇒ t
′′
1 in
n−1⇒ steps, and t′′1
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′1. By the induction hypothesis, there is a t
′′
2 such that t2 ⇒ t
′′
2 and
t′′1Rt
′′
2. Since t
′′
1
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′1 and R is a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation,
there are two cases to consider:
– there is a t′2 such that t
′′
2 ⇒ t
′
2, t
′′
1Rt
′
2, and t
′
1Rt
′
2. So t2 ⇒ t
′
2 such that t
′
1Rt
′
2.
– or there are s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′
1, . . . , s
′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
(Ci,τ)
−−−−→
s′i, with t
′′
1Rs
′′′
i and t
′
1Rs
′
i), and C1, . . . , Ck constitute a partitioning of C. By definition,
s′′′i
(Ci,τ)
−−−−→ s′i yields s
′′′
i ⇒ s
′
i. Consequently for any arbitrary i ≤ k, t2 ⇒ s
′
i such that
t′1Rs
′
i.
⊓⊔
Proposition A.3. The relation composition of two semi-branching reliable computed network bisim-
ulations is again a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation.
Proof:
LetR1 andR2 be semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulations with t1R1t2 and t2R2t3.
Let t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1. It must be shown that
• either η = τ and there is a t′3 such that t3 ⇒ t
′
3 with t1R1 ◦ R2t
′
3 and t
′
1R1 ◦ R2t
′
3; or
• ∃s′1, . . . , s
′
k, s
′′
1 , . . . , s
′′
k ∀i ≤ k (t3 ⇒ s
′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′i ∧ t1R1 ◦ R2s
′′
i ∧ t
′
1R1 ◦ R2s
′
i), where
〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 constitute a partitioning of 〈C〉.
Since t1R1t2, two cases can be considered:
• η = τ and there is a t′2 such that t2 ⇒ t
′
2 with t1R1t
′
2 and t
′
1R1t
′
2. Lemma A.2 yields that there
is a t′3 that t3 ⇒ t
′
3 with t
′
2R2t
′
3. It immediately follows that t1R1 ◦ R2t
′
3 and t
′
1R1 ◦ R2t
′
3.
• there exist s∗∗1 , . . . s
∗∗
j , s
∗
1 . . . s
∗
j for some j > 0 such that ∀i ≤ j (t2 ⇒ s
∗∗
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s∗i ,
t1R1s
∗∗
i , t
′
1R1s
∗
i ), and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Cj〉 is a partitioning of 〈C〉. Since t2R2t3 and t2 ⇒ s
∗∗
i ,
Lemma A.2 yields that there are s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
j such that ∀i ≤ j (t3 ⇒ s
′′′
i ∧ s
∗∗
i R2s
′′′
i ). Two
cases can be distinguished:
– either η = τ and for some i ≤ j, s∗∗i
(Ci,τ)
−−−−→ s∗i implies there is an s
′′
i such that s
′′′
i ⇒ s
′′
i
with s∗∗i R2s
′′
i and s
∗
iR2s
′′
i . It follows immediately that there is an s
′′
i such that t3 ⇒ s
′′
i
with t1R1 ◦ R2s
′′
i and t
′
1R1 ◦ R2s
′′
i ; or
– for all i ≤ j, s∗∗i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s∗i implies there are s
′′
i1
, . . . , s′′iki
and s′i1 , . . . , s
′
iki
for some ki >
0 such that ∀o ≤ ki (s
′′
i ⇒ s
′′
io
〈(Cio ,η)〉−−−−−−→ s′io , s
∗∗
i R2s
′′
io , s
∗
iR2s
′
io), and 〈Ci1〉, . . . , 〈Ciki 〉 is
a partitioning of 〈Ci〉. Since t3 ⇒ s
′′
i , we have ∀i ≤ j, ∀o ≤ ki (t3 ⇒ s
′′
io
〈(Cio ,η)〉−−−−−−→ s′io
with t1R1 ◦ R2s
′′
io
, t′1R1 ◦ R2s
′
io
), and {〈Cio〉 | i ≤ j, o < ki} is a partitioning of 〈C〉.
⊓⊔
Corollary A.4. Semi-branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence relation.
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It is not hard to see that the union of semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulations is
again a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation.
Proposition A.5. The largest semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation is a branching
reliable computed network bisimulation.
Proof:
Suppose R is the largest semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation for some given
CLTS. Let t1Rt2, t2 ⇒ t
′
2, t1Rt
′
2 and t
′
1Rt
′
2. We show that R
′ = R ∪ {(t′1, t2)} is a semi-branching
reliable computed network bisimulation.
1. If t′1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′′1 , then it follows from (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ R that
• either η = τ and there is a t′′2 such that t
′
2 ⇒ t
′′
2 with t
′
1Rt
′′
2 and t
′′
1Rt
′′
2 . Finally t2 ⇒ t
′
2
results t′1R
′t′′2 and t
′′
1R
′t′′2; or
• there are s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→
s′′i with (t
′
1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R) and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 is a partitioning of 〈C〉. And t2 ⇒ t
′
2
yields ∀i ≤ k (t2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′′i , with (t
′
1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R
′).
2. If t2
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′′2 , then it follows from (t1, t2) ∈ R that
• either η = τ , and there is a t′′1 such that t1 ⇒ t
′′
1 with t
′′
1Rt2 and t
′′
1Rt
′′
2. Furthermore,
(t1, t
′
2) ∈ R, t1 ⇒ t
′′
1 , and Lemma A.2 imply there is a t
′′′
2 such that t
′
2 ⇒ t
′′′
2 with
(t′′1 , t
′′′
2 ) ∈ R. Similarly (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ R, t
′
2 ⇒ t
′′′
2 , and Lemma A.2 imply there is a t
′′′
1 such
that t′1 ⇒ t
′′′
1 with (t
′′′
1 , t
′′′
2 ) ∈ R. From (t
′′′
1 , t
′′′
2 ) ∈ R, (t
′′′
2 , t
′′
1) ∈ R
−1, and (t′′1 , t2) ∈ R,
we conclude (t′′′1 , t2) ∈ R ◦ R
−1 ◦ R. And from (t′′′1 , t
′′′
2 ) ∈ R, (t
′′′
2 , t
′′
1) ∈ R
−1, and
(t′′1 , t
′′
2) ∈ R, we conclude (t
′′′
1 , t
′′
2) ∈ R ◦ R
−1 ◦ R.
• or there are s′′′11 , . . . , s
′′′
1k
and s′′11 , . . . , s
′′
1k
for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t1 ⇒
s′′′1i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′′1i with (s
′′′
1i
, t2), (s
′′
1i
, t′′2) ∈ R) and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 is a partitioning of
〈C〉. Since (t1, t
′
2) ∈ R and t1 ⇒ s
′′′
1i
, by Lemma A.2, there are s′′′21 , . . . , s
′′′
2k
such that
∀i ≤ k (t′2 ⇒ s
′′′
2i
and (s′′′1i , s
′′′
2i
) ∈ R). Since s′′′1i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′′1i , there are s
∗∗
2i1
, . . . , s∗∗2iki
and s∗2i1
, . . . , s∗2iki
for some ki > 0 such that ∀o ≤ ki (s
′′′
2i
⇒ s∗∗2io
〈(Cio ,η)〉−−−−−−→ s∗2io with
(s′′′1i , s
∗∗
2io
), (s′′1i , s
∗
2io
) ∈ R) and 〈Ci1〉, . . . , 〈Ciki 〉 is a partitioning of 〈Ci〉. Since t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
2i
and s′′′2i ⇒ s
∗∗
2io
, we have ∀i ≤ k, o ≤ ki (t
′
2 ⇒ s
∗∗
2io
). By assumption, (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R, so
by Lemma A.2 there are s∗∗11 , . . . , s
∗∗
1K
, where K =
∑k
i=1 ki, such that ∀z ≤ K (t
′
1 ⇒ s
∗∗
1z
and (s∗∗1z , s
∗∗
2io
) ∈ R, where z = (
∑i−1
j=1 kj) + o). Since s
∗∗
2io
〈(Cio ,η)〉−−−−−−→ s∗2io , there
are s∗∗∗1z1
, . . . , s∗∗∗1z
k′z
and s
′
1z1
, . . . , s
′
1z
k′z
for some k′z > 0 such that ∀j ≤ k
′
z (s
∗∗
1z ⇒
s∗∗∗1zj
〈(Cioj
,η)〉
−−−−−−−→ s
′
1zj
with (s∗∗∗1zj
, s∗∗2io ), (s
′
1zj
, s∗2io ) ∈ R) and 〈Cio1 〉, . . . , 〈Ciok′z
〉 is a parti-
tioning of 〈Cio〉. And t
′
1 ⇒ s
∗∗
1z yields ∀i ≤ k, o ≤ ki, j ≤ k
′
z(t
′
1 ⇒ s
∗∗∗
1zj
〈(Cioj
,η)〉
−−−−−−−→ s
′
1zj
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with
(s∗∗∗1zj
, s∗∗2io ) ∈ R ∧ (s
∗∗
2io
, s′′′1i) ∈ R
−1 ∧ (s′′′1i , t2) ∈ R
⇒ (s∗∗∗1zj
, t2) ∈ R ◦R
−1 ◦ R
(s
′
1zj
, s∗2io ) ∈ R ∧ (s
∗
2io
, s′′1i) ∈ R
−1 ∧ (s′′1i , t
′′
1) ∈ R
⇒ (s
′
1zj
, t′′2) ∈ R ◦ R
−1 ◦ R,
where z = (
∑i−1
l=1 kl) + o), and {〈Cioj 〉 | i ≤ k, o ≤ ki, j ≤ k
′
z} is a partitioning of 〈C〉.
By Proposition A.3,R◦R−1 ◦R is a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation.
SinceR is the largest semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation, and clearlyR ⊆
R ◦R−1 ◦ R, we have R = R ◦R−1 ◦ R.
So R′ is a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimulation. Since R is the largest semi-
branching reliable computed network bisimulation, R′ = R.
We will now prove thatR is a branching reliable computed network bisimulation. Let t1Rt2, and
t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1. We only consider the case when η = τ , because for other cases, the transfer condition
of Definition 5.3 and Definition A.1 are the same. Two cases can be distinguished:
1. There is a t′2 such that t2 ⇒ t
′
2 with t1Rt
′
2 and t
′
1Rt
′
2: we proved above that t
′
1Rt2. This agrees
with the first case of Definition 5.3.
2. There are s′′1, . . . , s
′′
k and s
′
1, . . . , s
′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t2 ⇒ s
′′
i
〈(Ci,τ)〉
−−−−−→ s′i
with t1Rs
′′
i and t
′
1Rs
′
i) and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 constitute a partitioning of 〈C〉. This agrees with the
second case of Definition 5.1.
Consequently R is a branching reliable computed network bisimulation. ⊓⊔
Since any branching reliable computed network bisimulation is a semi-branching reliable com-
puted network bisimulation, this yields the following corollary.
Corollary A.6. Two computed network terms are related by a branching reliable computed network
bisimulation if and only if they are related by a semi-branching reliable computed network bisimula-
tion.
Corollary A.7. Branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence relation.
Corollary A.8. Rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is an equivalence relation.
Proof:
It is easy to show that rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is reflexive and sym-
metric. To conclude the proof, we show that rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity
is transitive. Let t1 ≃rbr t2 and t2 ≃rbr t3. Since t1 ≃rbr t2, if t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1, then there is t
′
2 such that
t2
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′2 and t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2. Since t2 ≃rbr t3, there is a t
′
3 such that t3
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′3 and t
′
2 ≃br t
′
3.
Equivalence of branching reliable computed network bisimilarity yields t3
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′3 with t
′
1 ≃br t
′
3.
The same argumentation holds when t3
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′3. Consequently the transfer conditions of Defini-
tion 5.5 holds and t1 ≃rbr t3. ⊓⊔
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B. Rooted Branching Reliable Computed Network Bisimilarity is a Con-
gruence
Theorem B.1. Rooted branching reliable computed network bisimilarity is a congruence for terms
with respect to RCNT operators.
Proof:
We need to prove the following cases:
1. [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ implies [[α.t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[α.t2]]ℓ;
2. [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ and [[t
′
1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t
′
2]]ℓ implies [[t1 + t
′
1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2 + t
′
2]]ℓ;
3. [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ and [[t
′
1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t
′
2]]ℓ implies [[sense(ℓ
′, t1, t
′
1)]]ℓ ≃rbr [[sense(ℓ
′, t2, t
′
2)]]ℓ;
4. [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ implies ℓ : t : t1 ≃rbr ℓ : t : t2 for any arbitrary term t;
5. t1 ≃rbr t2 implies (C, η).t1 ≃rbr (C, η).t2;
6. t1 ≃rbr t2 and t
′
1 ≃rbr t
′
2 implies t1 + t
′
1 ≃rbr t2 + t
′
2;
7. t1 ≃rbr t2 implies (νℓ)t1 ≃rbr (νℓ)t2;
8. t1 ≃rbr t2 and t
′
1 ≃rbr t
′
2 implies t1 ‖ t
′
1 ≃rbr t2 ‖ t
′
2;
9. t1 ≃rbr t2 and t
′
1 ≃rbr t
′
2 implies t1 t
′
1 ≃rbr t2 t
′
2;
10. t1 ≃rbr t2 and t
′
1 ≃rbr t
′
2 implies t1 | t
′
1 ≃rbr t2 | t
′
2;
11. t1 ≃rbr t2 implies ∂M (t1) ≃rbr ∂M (t2);
12. t1 ≃rbr t2 implies τM (t1) ≃rbr τM (t2);
13. t1 ≃rbr t2 implies C ⊲ t1 ≃rbr C ⊲ t2.
Clearly, if t1 ≃rbr t2 then t1 ≃br t2 is witnessed by the following branching reliable computed
network bisimulation relation:
R′ = {R | t1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′1 ⇒ ∃t
′
2 · t2
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′2 ∧ t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2 is witnessed byR}
∪ {R | t2
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′2 ⇒ ∃t
′
1 · t1
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′1 ∧ t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2 is witnessed byR}
∪ {(t1, t2)}.
We prove the cases 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, and 13 since the proof of the cases 3 and 6 are similar to the
case 2, the case 5 is similar to the case 1, the cases 8 and 9 are similar to the case 10, and the case 12
is similar to the case 11.
Case 1. The first transitions of [[α.t1]]ℓ and [[α.t2]]ℓ are the same with application of the rule Snd (if
α is a send action), Rcv1 (if α is a receive action), or Rcv2 (for receiving (C,nrcv (m))which are not
derivable from Rcv1), and by assumption [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t1]]ℓ implies [[t1]]ℓ ≃br [[t1]]ℓ. Thus the transfer
conditions of Definition 5.5 hold.
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Case 2. Every transition [[t1 + t
′
1]]ℓ
(C,η)
−−−−→ t owes to [[t1]]ℓ
(C,η)
−−−−→ t or [[t′1]]ℓ
(C,η)
−−−−→ t by application of
Choice , or is implied by application of Rcv2, i.e., [[t1 + t
′
1]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t1 + t
′
1]]ℓ iff there exists
no [[t1 + t
′
1]]ℓ
(C′,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t for some t such that C 4 C′. For the former case, [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ and
[[t′1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t
′
2]]ℓ imply there is a t
′ such that [[t2]]ℓ
(〈C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′ or [[t′2]]ℓ
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′ and t ≃br t
′. Thus
[[t2+t
′
2]]ℓ
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ t′ with t ≃br t
′. For the latter case by Choice , there exists no [[t1]]ℓ
(C′,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t
and [[t′1]]ℓ
(C′,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t for some t such that C 4 C′. Thus by Rcv2, [[t1]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t1]]ℓ
and [[t′1]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′1]]ℓ. We remark that transitions derived by application of Rcv2 are those
that cannot be derived from Rcv 1. The greatest value of the network constraints of such transitions
either have the disconnectivity pair in the form of ? 6 ℓ or have no connectivity pair in the form of
? ℓ. This implies that such transitions can not be mimicked by application of Rcv1 (since it will
add constraints of the form ?  ℓ) . Therefore, [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ and [[t
′
1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t
′
2]]ℓ imply that
[[t2]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t2]]ℓ and [[t
′
2]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′2]]ℓ which are derived by application of Rcv2.
Consequently [[t2 + t
′
2]]ℓ
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t2 + t
′
2]]ℓ.
Case 4 Suppose that ℓ : t : t1
(C∗,η)
−−−−→ t∗, then three cases can be distinguished:
• It owes to t1
(C,snd(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′1 by application of Inter
′
1, and C
∗ = C[ℓ/?], η = nsnd(m, ℓ) and
t∗ = [[t′1]]ℓ. By application of Snd , it implies that [[t1]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′1]]ℓ. By as-
sumption [[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ implies that [[t2]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′2]]ℓ and [[t
′
1]]ℓ ≃br [[t
′
2]]ℓ.
Therefore, by rule Snd , t2
(C,snd(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′2, and hence by application of Inter
′
1, ℓ : t :
t2
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′2]]ℓ.
• It owes to t1
(C,rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t′1 by application of either Inter
′
2 or Inter
′
3. This case is proved with
the same argumentation as the previous case.
• If t1 and t2 are of the form sense(ℓ
′, t∗1, t
∗∗
1 ) and sense(ℓ
′, t∗2, t
∗∗
2 ) respectively, and the transition
owes to either Sen3 or Sen4. Assume it was derived by Sen3, as the other case can be proved
with the same argumentation. Thus, t∗1 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→, t∗∗1
(C,rcv (m))
−−−−−−−−→ t∗∗1
′, C∗ = {ℓ′ ℓ} ∪ C[ℓ/?],
η = nrcv(m) and t∗ = t. Therefore, by application of Rcv2, [[t1]]ℓ
(C∗,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t1]]ℓ, and
by application of Sen2 and Rcv1, [[t1]]ℓ
({ℓ′ 6 ℓ}∪C[ℓ/?],nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t∗∗1
′]]ℓ. By assumption
[[t1]]ℓ ≃rbr [[t2]]ℓ implies that [[t2]]ℓ
(C∗,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t2]]ℓ and [[t2]]ℓ
({ℓ′ 6 ℓ}∪C[ℓ/?],nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[[t∗∗2
′]]ℓ where [[t
∗∗
1
′]]ℓ ≃br [[t
∗∗
2
′]]ℓ. Thus, t
∗
2 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→, t∗∗2
(C,rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−→ t∗∗2
′ (as the only way to
generate the pair ℓ′ 6 ℓ is through the sense operator) and ℓ : t : t2
(C∗,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t by
application of Sen3.
Case 7. We prove that if t1 ≃br t2 then (νℓ)t1 ≃br (νℓ)t2. Let t1 ≃br t2 be witnessed by the branching
reliable computed network bisimulation relation R. We define R′ = {((νℓ)t′1, (νℓ)t
′
2)|(t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈
R}. We prove that R′ is a branching reliable computed network bisimulation relation. Suppose
(νℓ)t′1
(C′,η′)
−−−−→ (νℓ)t′′1 results from the application of Hid on t
′
1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′′1 . Since (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ R, there
are two cases; in the first case η is a τ action and (t′′1 , t
′
2) ∈ R, consequently ((νℓ)t
′′
1 , (νℓ)t
′
2) ∈ R
′. In
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second case there are s′′′1 , . . . s
′′′
k and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→
s′′i with (t
′
1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R), and 〈C1〉 . . . , 〈Ck〉 is a partitioning of 〈C〉. By application of Hid ,
∀i ≤ k ((νℓ)t′2 ⇒ (νℓ)s
′′′
i with ((νℓ)t
′
1, (νℓ)s
′′′
i ) ∈ R
′). There are two cases to consider:
• 〈(Ci, η)〉 = (Ci, η): Consequently (νℓ)s
′′′
i
(C′i,η
′)
−−−−→ (νℓ)s′′i where (C
′
i, η
′) = (Ci, η)[?/ℓ].
• 〈(Ci, η)〉 6= (Ci, η): in this case η is of the form nsnd(m, ?), η
′ = η, and C′i = Ci[?/ℓ]. If
〈(Ci, η)〉 = (Ci, η)[ℓ/?] then 〈(Ci, η)〉[?/ℓ] = (C
′
i, η
′) holds, otherwise 〈(Ci, η)〉 = (Ci, η)[ℓ
′/?],
where ℓ′ 6= ℓ, and hence 〈(Ci, η)〉[?/ℓ] is a counterpart of (C
′
i, η
′). Consequently (νℓ)s′′′i
〈(C′i,η
′)〉
−−−−−−→
(νℓ)s′′i .
Owing to the fact that a subset of C1[?/ℓ], . . . , Ck[?/ℓ] constitutes a partitioning of C[ℓ/?], and ac-
cording to the discussion above, there are s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
j and s
′′
1 , . . . , s
′′
j for some j ≤ k such that
∀i ≤ j, (νℓ)t′2 ⇒ (νℓ)s
′′′
i
〈(C′i,η
′)〉
−−−−−−→ (νℓ)s′′i with ((νℓ)t
′
1, (νℓ)s
′′′
i ), ((νℓ)t
′′
1 , (νℓ)s
′′
i ) ∈ R
′), and
〈C′1〉, . . . , 〈C
′
j〉 is a partitioning of 〈C
′〉.
Likewise we can prove that t1 ≃rbr t2 implies (νℓ)t1 ≃rbr (νℓ)t2. To this aim we examine
the root condition in Definition 5.5. Suppose (νℓ)t1
(C′,η′)
−−−−→ (νℓ)t′1. With the same argument as
above, (νℓ)t2
〈(C′,η′)〉
−−−−−−→ (νℓ)t′2. Since t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2, we proved that (νℓ)t
′
1 ≃br (νℓ)t
′
2. Concluding
(νℓ)t1 ≃rbr (νℓ)t2.
Case 10. From the three remaining cases, we focus on the most challenging case, which is the com-
munication merge operator |, as the other operators are proved in a similar way. First we prove
that if t1 ≃br t2, then t1 ‖ t ≃br t2 ‖ t. Let t1 ≃br t2 be witnessed by the branching reli-
able computed network bisimulation relation R. We define R′ = {(t′1 ‖ t
′, t′2 ‖ t
′) | (t′1, t
′
2) ∈
R, t′ any computed network term}. We prove that R′ is a branching reliable computed network
bisimulation relation. Suppose t′1 ‖ t
(C∗,η)
−−−−→ t∗. There are several cases to consider:
• Suppose η is of the form nsnd(m, ℓ). First let it be performed by t′1, and t participated in the
communication. That is, t′1
(C1,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1 and t
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′ give rise to the transition
t′1 ‖ t
(C1∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1 ‖ t
′. As (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R and t
′
1
(C1,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1 , there are
s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
(C1i [ℓ
′/ℓ],nsnd(m,ℓ′))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
s′′i , where (ℓ =? ∨ ℓ = ℓ
′), with (t′1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R), and C11 [ℓ
′/ℓ], . . . , C1k [ℓ
′/ℓ] is a parti-
tioning of C1[ℓ
′/ℓ]. Hence ∀i ≤ k (t′2 ‖ t⇒ s
′′′
i ‖ t
((C1i [ℓ
′/ℓ]∪C)[ℓ′/?],nsnd(m,ℓ′))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′′i ‖ t
′
with (t′1 ‖ t, s
′′′
i ‖ t), (t
′′
1 ‖ t
′, s′′i ‖ t
′) ∈ R′), and (C11 [ℓ
′/ℓ]∪C)[ℓ′/?], . . . , (C1k [ℓ
′/ℓ]∪C)[ℓ′/?]
is a partitioning of (C1[ℓ
′/ℓ] ∪ C)[ℓ′/?].
Now suppose that the send action was performed by t, and t′1 participated in the communi-
cation. That is, t′1
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1 and t
(C,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′ give rise to the transition
t′1 ‖ t
(C1∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1 ‖ t
′. Since (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R and t
′
1
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′′1, there are
s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
(C1i ,nrcv(m))−−−−−−−−−−→ s′′i with
(t′1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R), and C11 , . . . , C1k is a partitioning of C1. Therefore, ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ‖ t ⇒
s′′′i ‖ t
(C1i∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ s′′i ‖ t
′, and (t′1 ‖ t, s
′′′
i ‖ t), (t
′′
1 ‖ t
′, s′′i ‖ t
′) ∈ R′) and
C11 ∪ C[ℓ/?], . . . , C1k ∪ C[ℓ/?] constitute a partitioning of C1 ∪ C[ℓ/?].
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• The case where η is a receive action is proved in a similar way to the previous case.
• Suppose η is a τ action. Assume it originates from t1 by application of Par . Thus t
′
1
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′′1
and (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R implies: either (t
′′
1 , t
′
2) ∈ R and consequently (t
′′
1 ‖ t, t
′
2 ‖ t) ∈ R
′, or there
are s′′′1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′′
1 , . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
(Ci,τ)
−−−−→ s′′i with
(t′1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R), and C1, . . . , Ck constitute a partitioning of C. Therefore, ∀i ≤ k (t
′
2 ‖
t ⇒ s′′′i ‖ t
(Ci,τ)
−−−−→ s′′i ‖ t
′, and (t′1 ‖ t, s
′′′
i ‖ t), (t
′′
1 ‖ t
′, s′′i ‖ t
′) ∈ R′). The case when
t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′ implies t′1 ‖ t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′ by application of Par is straightforward.
• The case when η is an internal action is easy to prove (similar to the second case of the previous
case).
Likewise we can prove that t1 ≃rbr t2 implies t ‖ t1 ≃rbr t ‖ t2.
Now let t1 ≃rbr t2. To prove t1 | t ≃rbr t2 | t, we examine the root condition from Definition 5.5.
Suppose t1 | t
(C∗,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t∗. There are two cases to consider:
• This send action was performed by t1 at node ℓ, and t participated in the communication. That is,
t1
(C1,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 and t
(C,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′, so that t1 | t
(C1∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 ‖ t
′.
Since t1 ≃rbr t2, there is a t
′
2 such that t2
(C1,nsnd(m,ℓ′))
−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2 with (ℓ =? ∨ ℓ = ℓ
′) and
t′1 ≃br t
′
2. Then t2 | t
(C1∪C[ℓ′/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2 ‖ t
′. Since t′1 ≃br t
′
2, we proved that
t′1 ‖ t
′ ≃br t
′
2 ‖ t
′.
• The send action was performed by t at node ℓ, and t1 participated in the communication. That
is, t1
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′1 and t
(C,nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′, so that t1 | t
(C1∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
t′1 ‖ t
′. Since t1 ≃rbr t2, there is a t
′
2 such that t2
(C1,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2 with t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2. Then
t2 | t
(C1∪C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ t′2 ‖ t
′. Since t′1 ≃br t
′
2, we have t
′
1 ‖ t
′ ≃br t
′
2 ‖ t
′.
Finally, the case where t1 | t
(C∗,nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ t∗ can be easily dealt with. This receive action was
performed by both t1 and t.
Concluding, t1 | t ≃rbr t2 | t. Likewise it can be argued that t | t1 ≃rbr t | t2.
Case 11. We prove that if t1 ≃br t2, then ∂M (t1) ≃br ∂M (t2). Let t1 ≃br t2 be witnessed by the
branching reliable computed network bisimulation relation R. We define R′ = {(∂M (t
′
1), ∂M (t
′
2)) |
(t′1, t
′
2) ∈ R}. We prove that R
′ is a branching reliable computed network bisimulation relation.
Suppose that ∂M (t
′
1)
(C,η)
−−−−→ ∂M (t
′′
1) results from the application of Encap on t
′
1
(C,η)
−−−−→ t′′1 such
that η 6= nrcv (m) ∨ isTypem(m) = F . Since (t
′
1, t
′
2) ∈ R, two cases can be considered: either
η is a τ action and (t′′1 , t
′
2) ∈ R, or there are s
′′′
1 , . . . , s
′′′
k and s
′′
1, . . . , s
′′
k for some k > 0 such that
∀i ≤ k (t′2 ⇒ s
′′′
i
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ s′′i with (t
′
1, s
′′′
i ), (t
′′
1 , s
′′
i ) ∈ R) and 〈C1〉, . . . , 〈Ck〉 is a partitioning of
〈C〉. In the former case, (∂M (t
′′
1), ∂M (t
′
2)) ∈ R
′. In the latter case, by application of Par and Encap,
∀i ≤ k (∂M (t
′
2)⇒ ∂M (s
′′′
i )
〈(Ci,η)〉
−−−−−→ ∂M (t
′′
2) with (∂M (t
′
1), ∂M (s
′′′
i )), (∂M (t
′′
1), ∂M (s
′′
i )) ∈ R
′).
Likewise we can prove that t1 ≃rbr t2 implies ∂M (t1) ≃rbr ∂M (t2). To this aim we examine
the root condition in Definition 5.5. Suppose ∂M (t1)
(C,η)
−−−−→ ∂M (t
′
1). With the same argument as
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above, ∂M (t2)
〈(C,η)〉
−−−−−→ ∂M (t
′
2). Since t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2, we proved that ∂M (t
′
1) ≃br ∂M (t
′
2). Concluding
∂M (t1) ≃rbr ∂M (t2).
Case 13 Suppose that C ⊲ t1
(C′∪C,η)
−−−−−−−→ t′1 by application of TR since t1
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′1. By assumption
t1 ≃rbr t2 implies that t2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′2 and t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2. Therefore, by application ofTR, C⊲t2
(C′∪C,η)
−−−−−−−→
t′2, and t
′
1 ≃br t
′
2 concludes that C ⊲ t1 ≃rbr C ⊲ t2.
⊓⊔
C. Soundness of RCNT axiomatization
As two rooted branching computed network bisimilar terms are also rooted branching reliable com-
puted network bisimilar, the soundness of axioms which are in common with the lossy setting are
established [24]. Thus, to prove Theorem 6.1, it suffices to prove the soundness of each new axiom in
comparison with the lossy setting, i.e., Dep0−7, TRes1−5, LM
′
1,2, and T1, modulo rooted branching
reliable computed network bisimilarity.
We focus on the soundness of Dep0 and T1, as the soundness of the remaining axioms can be
argued in a similar fashion. To prove Dep0, we show that both sides of the axiom satisfy the transfer
conditions of Definition 5.5. Three cases can be distinguished. In following cases, for the sake of
brevity, we write X for recQ ·
∑
m′ 6∈Message(t,∅)({},nrcv (m
′)).Q+ ℓ : Q : t:
1. Assume [[t]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ since t
C,snd(m)
−−−−−−−→ t′ by application of Snd . By appli-
cation of Inter ′1, ℓ : X : t
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ. Then, by application of Rec and Choice ,
X
(C[ℓ/?],nsnd(m,ℓ))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ.
2. Assume [[t]]ℓ
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? ℓ},nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ since t
C,rcv(m)
−−−−−−→ t′ by application of Rcv1.
Thus by application of Inter ′2, ℓ : X : t
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? ℓ},nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ. Then, by applica-
tion of Rec and Choice , X
(C[ℓ/?]∪{? ℓ},nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ.
3. Assume [[t]]ℓ
(C,nrcv (m))
−−−−−−−−−→ [[t]]ℓ since [[t]]ℓ 6
(C,rcv(m)
−−−−−−−−→ and ∄C′([[t]]ℓ 6
(C′, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ ∧C 4
C′) by application of Rcv2. Two cases can be distinguished:
• Assume t 6
rcv(m)
−−−−−→, and consequently m ∈ Message(t). Thus, by application of Rec,
Choice and Prefix , X
(C,nrcv(m)
−−−−−−−−→ X, where C = {}.
• t
(C′′,rcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−→ t′ for some t′, and consequently m 6∈ Message(t). Thus, the assump-
tion [[t]]ℓ 6
(C,rcv(m)
−−−−−−−−→ and ∄C′([[t]]ℓ 6
(C′, nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−→ ∧C 4 C′) imply that ? 6 ℓ ∈ C
while ? ℓ ∈ C′′ due to application of Rcv1. Then by application of Inter
′
3, ℓ : X :
t
(C[ℓ/?]∪{?6 ℓ},nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ. Hence, X
(C[ℓ/?]∪{?6 ℓ},nrcv(m))
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [[t′]]ℓ by
application of Rec and Choice .
We focus on the soundness of T1. The only transition that the terms (C
′, η).((C1, η).t+ (C2, η).t+ t
′)
and (C′, η).((C, η).t + t′) in T1 can do is
(C′,η)
−−−−→ and the resulting terms (C1, η).t + (C2, η).t + t
′
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and (C, η).t + t′ are branching reliable computed network bisimilar, witnessed by the relation R
constructed as follows:
R = {((C1, η).t+ (C2, η).t+ t
′, (C, η).t + t′), (t, t) | t ∈ RCNT}
The pair ((C1, η).t + (C2, η).t + t
′, (C, η).t + t′) satisfies the transfer conditions of Definition 5.3.
Because every initial transition that (C1, η).t+ (C2, η).t+ t
′ can perform owing to t′, (C, η).t+ t′ can
perform too. If (C1, η).t + (C2, η).t + t
′ can perform a (C1, η) or (C2, η)-transition, (C, η).t + t
′ can
also perform it by application of Exe . Vice versa, if (C, η).t + t′ can perform a (C, η)-transition, then
as C1 and C2 form a partitioning of C, (C1, η).t + (C2, η).t + t
′ can perform a corresponding (C1, η)-
or (C2, η)-transition.
D. Completeness of RCNT axiomatization
To define RCNT terms with a finite-state behavior, we borrow the syntactical restriction of [24] on
recursive terms recA · t, following the approach of [30]. We consider so-called finite-state Reliable
Computed Network Theory (RCNTf ), obtained by restricting recursive terms recA · t to those that
of which the bound network names do not occur in the scope of parallel, communication merge, left
merge, hide, encapsulation and abstraction operators in t.
We follow the corresponding proof of [24] to prove Theorem 6.2 by performing the following
steps:
1. first we show that each RCNTf term can be turned into a normal form consisting of only
0, (C, η).t′, t′ + t′′ and recA · t′, where A is guarded in t′;
2. next we define recursive network specifications and prove that each guarded recursive network
specification has a unique solution;
3. finally we show that our axiomatization is ground-complete for normal forms, by showing that
equivalent normal forms are solutions for the same guarded recursive network specification.
Completeness of our axiomatization for all RCNTf terms results from the steps 1 and 3. We only
discuss the first step, as others are exactly the same as in the lossy setting.
Proposition D.1. Each closed term t of RCNTf whose network names do not occur in the scope of
one of the operators ‖, , |, (νℓ), τM or ∂M for some ℓ ∈ Loc and M ⊆ Msg , can be turned into a
normal form.
We prove this by structural induction over the syntax of terms t (possibly open). The base cases of
induction for t ≡ 0 or t ≡ A are trivial because they are in normal form already. The inductive cases
of the induction are the following ones:
• if t ≡ [[0]]ℓ, then by application ofDep0,4 andCh1 we have t = recQ·
∑
m′ 6∈Msg({},nrcv (m
′)).Q,
which is in normal form.
• if t ≡ [[α.t′]]ℓ or t ≡ [[t
′ + t′′]]ℓ or [[sense(ℓ
′, t′, t′′)]]ℓ or [[A]]ℓ, then t can be turned into a normal
form by application of axioms Dep0−5,6,7 and induction over [[t
′]]ℓ and [[t
′′]]ℓ.
• if t ≡ (C, η).t′ or t ≡ t′ + t′′, then t can be turned into normal form by induction over t′ and t′′.
• the other cases can be treated in the same way as in [24].
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E. Proofs of Section 7.2
We first prove Theorem 7.2 which indicates that the refinement relation is a preorder relation and has
the precongruence property, and then we discuss the proof of Proposition 7.3.
E.1. Proof of Theorem 7.2
We first show that the refinement relation is a preorder relation and then discuss its precongruence
property. To prove that refinement is a preorder, we must show that it is reflexive and transitive. As it
is trivial that Definition 7.1 is reflexive, we focus on its transitivity property.
Regrading the well-formedness conditions imposed on RCNT terms, the transitivity property of
our refinement relation, i.e., t1 ⊑ t2 and t2 ⊑ s implies that t1 ⊑ s, can be only proved when t1 and t2
have no prefixed-actions with a multi-hop network constraint. For such terms, Definition 7.1 enforces
they mimic the behavior of each other by the first and third conditions. In other words, for reliable
computed network terms with no prefixed-actions with multi-hop network constraints, refinement and
strong bisimulation of [51] coincide.
Lemma E.1. (Transitive property)
t1 ⊑ t2 and t2 ⊑ s implies that t1 ⊑ s.
Proof:
Assume sets of refinement relations R1C and R
2
C witnessing t1 ⊑ t2 and t2 ⊑ s, respectively. We
construct a set of refinement relations R′C = {(t
′
1, s
′) | (t′2, s
′) ∈ R2C ∧ t
′
1R
1
C t2} for any well-
formed network constraint C. We show that t′1R
′
Cs
′ satisfies the transfer conditions of Definition 7.1.
Assume t′1
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′′1. By assumption t
′
1R
1
Ct
′
2 implies that t
′
2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′′2 such that t
′′
1R
1
C∪C′t
′′
2 . By
the assumption t′2R
2
Cs
′, there are three cases to consider:
• η = τ and t′′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′ with C ∪ C′ |=M. Thus by construction, t′′1 R
′
C∪C′ s
′.
• There is an s′′ such that s′
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′′, and t′′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′′, and C ∪ C′ |=M. Thus by construction,
t′′1 R
′
C∪C′ s
′.
• η = ι for some ι ∈ IAct ∪ {τ} and there is an s′′ such that s′
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′′ with t′′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′′.
Thus by construction, t′′1 R
′
C∪C′ s
′′.
Assume s′
(C′,η)
−−−−→ s′′. Hence t′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′ implies that there is a t′′2 such that t
′
2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′′2 with
t′′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′′. By assumption t′1R
1
Ct
′
2 implies that t
′
1
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′′1 such that t
′′
1R
1
C∪C′t
′′
2, and consequently
t′′1 R
′
C∪C′ s
′′.
Assume s
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′. Therefore t′2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′ implies that there are t′′′2 and t
′′
2 such that t
′
2
C′
=⇒
t′′′2
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′′2 with t
′′′
2 R
2
C∪C′ s
′ and t′′2 R
2
C∪C′∪C′′ s
′′. As every transition of t′2 is mimicked by t
′
1, there
are t′′′1 and t
′′
1 such that t
′
1
C′
=⇒ t′′′1
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′′1 with t
′′′
1 R
1
C∪C′ t
′′′
2 and t
′′
1 R
1
C∪C′∪C′′ t
′′
2. Concluding, there
are t′′′1 and t
′′
1 such that t
′
1
C′
=⇒ t′′′1
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′′1 with t
′′′
1 R
′
C∪C′ s
′ and t′′1 R
′
C∪C′∪C′′ s
′′. ⊓⊔
Theorem E.2. Refinement is a precongruence for terms with respect to the RCNT operators.
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Proof:
Assume that t1 ⊑ s1 and t2 ⊑ s2. We first show that t1 + t2 ⊑ s1 + s2. There are sets of refinement
relations R1C and R
2
C witnessing t1 ⊑ s1 and t2 ⊑ s2, respectively. We construct a set of refinement
relationsRC = R
1
C∪R
2
C∪{(t
′
1, s1+s2) | t
′
1 R
1
C s1}∪{(t
′
2, s1+s2) | t
′
2 R
2
C s2} for any well-formed
network constraint C. We show that R{ } = {(t1 + t2, s1 + s2)} ∪ R
1
{ } ∪ R
2
{ } satisfies the transfer
conditions of Definition 7.1.
Assume t1 + t2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′1 owing to t1
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′1. By assumption t1 R
1
{ } s1. Three cases can be
considered:
• η = τ and t′1 RC∪C′ s1, with C ∪ C
′ |=M. Thus by construction t′1 RC∪C′ s1 + s2.
• There is an s′1 such that s1
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′1, and t
′
1 R
1
C∪C′ s
′
1, and C ∪ C
′ |= M. Thus by sos rule
Choice , there is an s′1 such that s1 + s2
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′1 and by construction t
′
1 RC∪C′ s
′
1.
• η = ι for some ι ∈ IAct ∪ {τ} and there is an s′1 such that s1
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′1 with t
′
1 R
1
C∪C′ s
′
1.
Thus by the sos rule Choice , there is an s′1 such that s1 + s2
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′1 and by construction
t′1 RC∪C′ s
′
1.
The same discussion holds if t1 + t2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′2 owing to t2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′2.
Assume s1 + s2
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′1 owing to s1
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′1. By assumption t1 R
1
C s1 implies there
are t′′1 and t
′
1 such that t1
C′
=⇒ t′′1
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′1 with t
′′
1 R
1
C∪C′ s1 and t
′
1 R
1
C∪C′∪C′′ s
′
1. Consequently
t1 + t2
C′
=⇒ t′′1
(C′′,ι)
−−−−→ t′1 with t
′′
1 RC∪C′ s1 + s2 and t
′
1 RC∪C′∪C′′ s
′
1. The same discussion holds when
s1 + s2
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′2 owing to s2
(M,ι)
−−−−→ s′2.
Assume s1 + s2
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′1 owing to s1
(C,η)
−−−−→ s′1. By assumption t1 R
1
C s1 implies there is a
t′1 such that t1
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′1 with t
′
1 R
1
C∪C′ s
′
1. Hence, there is a t
′
1 such that t1 + t2
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′1 with
t′1 RC∪C′ s
′
1.
The above discussions together yield t1 + t2 ⊑ s1 + s2.
If s1 and s2 have no prefixed-action with a multi-hop network constraint, then we must show the
following cases:
1. (C, η).t1 ⊑ (C, η).t2;
2. (νℓ).t1 ⊑ (νℓ).t2;
3. t1 ‖ t2 ⊑ s1 ‖ s2;
4. t1 t2 ⊑ s1 s2;
5. t1 | t2 ⊑ s1 | s2;
6. ∂M (t1) ⊑ ∂M (t2);
7. τ(t1) ⊑ τ(t2);
8. C ⊲ t1 ⊑ C ⊲ t2;
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The above cases result from the congruence property of strong bisimilarity.
⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 7.2 is an immediate result of Lemma E.1 and Theorem E.2.
E.2. Proof of Proposition 7.3
First we show that (C, τ).t ⊑ (M, ι).s ⇒ C ⊲ t ⊑ (M, ι).s ∧ C |= M. The only transition
(C, τ).t can make is (C, τ).t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t. As ι 6= τ , according to Definition 7.1, t RC (M, ι).s. We
construct R′{ } = RC and show that it induces C ⊲ t ⊑ (M, ι).s. This is trivial as any transition
C ⊲ t
(C∪C′,η)
−−−−−−−→ t′ is the result of t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′. The reverse of the rule can be argued in a similar
fashion.
Now, we show that (C, ι).t ⊑ (M, ι).s ⇒ C ⊲ t ⊑ s. The only transition (C, ι).t can make is
(C, ι).t
(C,τ)
−−−−→ t. As ι 6= τ and ι ∈ IAct , according to Definition 7.1, tRC s. We constructR
′
{ } = RC
and show that it induces C ⊲ t ⊑ s. This is trivial as any transition C ⊲ t
(C∪C′,η)
−−−−−−−→ t′ is the result of
t
(C′,η)
−−−−→ t′. The reverse of the rule can be argued in a similar fashion.
